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IS GRIGGS DEAD? REFLECTING (FEARFULLY) ON
WARDS COVE PACKING CO. v. A TONIO
MACK A. PLAYER
In this Article Professor Player analyzes the effect of the recent
United States Supreme Court decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio on impact analysis under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
as it has evolved since the seminal case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
Notwithstanding facially dramatic changes announced in Wards Cove
Packing, the author concludes that the decision need not produce dra-
matic changes in results. Professor Player also suggests that the courts
should examine the underlying premises of impact analysis, and fi-
nally recommends that the courts impose on employers a two-tier evi-
dentiary burden based on the strength of the presumed motive flowing
from the degree of impact that the selection device has on employ-
ment opportunities of women and minorities.
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IS GRIGGS DEAD? REFLECTING (FEARFULLY) ON
WARDS COVE PACKING CO. v. A TONIO
MACK A. PLAYER*
T ITLE VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' proscribes discrimina-
tion in employment because of race, color, sex, national origin
and religion, and does so in language suggesting that liability is prem-
ised on improper motivation. Little in the language of the Act and
even less from its legislative history suggests that liability can be prem-
ised solely on the effect a selection device has on a class protected by
the statute. Nonetheless, in the seminal case of Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 2 the Supreme Court held that Title VII liability would be estab-
lished when a device, neutral both on its face and in terms of intent,
had an adverse effect on the employment opportunities of a class pro-
tected by the Act, and the employer could not justify the device in
terms of "business necessity." 3 From this holding evolved a two-, or
perhaps three-, step analysis in which the plaintiff had the initial bur-
den of proving that the device or system adversely affected a class
protected by Title VII. If the plaintiff accomplished this, the burden
then shifted to the employer to prove the "business necessity" of the
challenged device. If the defendant met this burden, the plaintiff
could present evidence of the existence of alternatives which could
serve the employer's goals equally well but with less of a discrimina-
tory effect.4
In the seventeen years between Griggs and the Court's recent deci-
sion in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,5 the Court failed to define
with any precision what it meant by "business necessity." Wards
Cove Packing provides that definition. Moreover, without ever pre-
cisely so holding, the Court over the years appeared to assume that
the employer's burden in regard to the "business necessity" element
was a burden of persuasion; this assumption had been adopted by
every appellate court in the nation.6 Wards Cove Packing destroyed
that assumption. In thus redefining the defendant's burden in adverse
* Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law; A.B., 1962, Drury College;
J.D., 1965, University of Missouri; LL.M., 1972, George Washington University.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-(17) (1988).
2. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
3. Id. at 436.
4. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
5. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
6. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
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impact cases, the Court also identified the role of evidence suggesting
the presence of "lesser discriminatory alternatives. "7
This altering of shared assumptions as to the employer's burden in
impact cases requires reexamination of virtually every such case de-
cided since Griggs. In conducting this reevaluation, it is significant
to note that Wards Cove Packing did not overrule, or even criticize,
the numerous applications by the Court of the business necessity doc-
trine. This suggests that the Court's restatement of "business neces-
sity," while using different words that fall far short of any dictionary
definition of "necessity," nonetheless does not in fact create a signifi-
cantly lighter standard than had been generally adopted prior to
Wards Cove Packing.
No doubt the most significant aspect of Wards Cove Packing is its
removal from the defendant of the burden of persuasion on the issue
of business necessity, leaving with the defendant only a burden of pre-
senting evidence on this issue.' While this change in the law seems
dramatic, it may not in reality produce dramatic changes. In past ma-
jor cases where the plaintiff has prevailed, it has been because the de-
fendant failed to produce legally sufficient evidence from which the
necessary relationship between the selection device and the employer
goals could be found to exist; that is, the defendant failed because of
failure to meet its burden of production. Because Wards Cove Pack-
ing did not reverse these past cases, the law announced in these cases
remains unchanged. Therefore the defendant must still produce signif-
icant evidence to justify use of exclusionary devices. If the defendant
fails to carry this burden, much as before, the plaintiff can expect to
prevail.
Thus, projections of the demise of Griggs may be exaggerated. Per-
haps, when the dust settles, the shifted burden of persuasion will re-
sult in a different outcome only in close cases, where the defendant
has presented significant evidence of business justification demanded
by the post-Griggs-and still valid-cases, and the plaintiff counters
with a significant challenge to that justification. In cases where the
defendants have presented strong evidence of necessity and have pre-
vailed, they will continue to prevail. Where the defendants have failed
because of insufficient evidence establishing a relationship between
the challenged device and their business-related concerns, they should
fail as they did before. Defendants must continue to meet the signifi-
cant burden of presenting evidence sufficient for a fact finder to find
that the necessary nexus exists.
7. See infra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
8. Wards Cove Packing, 109 S. Ct. at 2126.
19891
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In a broader sense, Wards Cove Packing refocuses the need to eval-
uate the fundamental premise upon which Title VII impact analysis
has proceeded throughout the years. Wards Cove Packing and its an-
cestors may be too narrow in their analytical focus; this narrowness in
many instances may have resulted in unfairness to both employers and
employees. All Title VII impact cases, from Griggs to Wards Cove
Packing, have relied upon a two-step analysis to create liability, each
step being essentially a unitary standard unrelated to the other step.
From Griggs to Wards Cove Packing, courts have disagreed over
the proper line at which to set the standards at each step in the analy-
sis. Griggs established a relatively low threshold of proving impact,
and seemed to demand from employers a relatively high level of busi-
ness necessity justification. Wards Cove Packing now indicates that a
relatively high level of impact must be established by a plaintiff to
trigger any employer's obligation to justify use of the device. Further,
once that level of impact has been established by the plaintiff, the em-
ployer's burden of justification is now lower than the burden imposed
by Griggs and its progeny. Regardless of the quantum imposed by the
standard adopted at the particular time, a single threshold burden of
proving impact exists. After the plaintiff has crossed that threshold,
the employer's burden remains the same, regardless of whether the
level of the impact is relatively slight or devastatingly exclusionary.
Thus, the standard can be both overinclusive and underinclusive. It
may demand too great a showing of necessity if impact is slight, or
too little of a justification in the face of devastating effect.
What is needed is a standard of greater flexibility, one that meas-
ures the level of the employer's burden by the level of the impact the
challenged device has on employment opportunities of a protected
class. Devices of relatively slight impact can and should be justified by
the employer's presenting evidence of legitimate business concerns
that are rationally served by the device-a relatively light burden. On
the other hand, if the device proves to be destructive of the statutory
goal of equal employment opportunity, the burden on the employer
should be correspondingly greater. The burden on such an employer
to justify exclusionary devices should be that of proving-not just
presenting evidence on-the true and absolute business necessity for
use of the device.
This two-level, flexible standard can be accomplished by abandon-
ing the notion pioneered in Griggs that motivation is unnecessary in
an impact case, and adopting the concept used in labor relations cases
that impact is evidence of motivation. 9 Motive can be presumed from
9. See infra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 17:1
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impact; the strength of that presumption should increase with the de-
gree of impact. The greater the presumption of illegal motivation
flowing from the impact, the greater the defendant's burden should be
in negating that presumption.
I. GRIGGS AND THE CONCEPT OF "IMPACT ANALYSIS"
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 10 introduced impact analysis into em-
ployment discrimination law. In Griggs the Supreme Court held that
use of a neutral employment selection device that results in a specific
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin being treated differently is
an act of forbidden discrimination, if the device has an adverse impact
on the members of any of those classes and the use of the device can-
not be justified in terms of "business necessity.""
The employer, Duke Power Company, required new employees in
all nonlabor departments to possess a high school diploma and to
make a minimum score on two objective, pen-and-paper achievement
tests. The plaintiffs were black applicants who lacked these creden-
tials. 2 The trial court construed Title VII to require proof of a racial
motive and held that the employer imposed these requirements in
good faith, without any intent to exclude the applicants because of
their race.'3 While the trial court's finding of no racial motivation on
the part of Duke Power for imposing these facially neutral selection
devices was suspect, 4 in light of evidence of the employer's good faith
presented at trial 5 it would have been difficult for an appellate court
to reverse on this factual ground. 6 In any event, the thirteen black
employees petitioning the Supreme Court had a broader vision of the
statute than simply securing a reversal on the narrow factual issue of
the employer's good faith. Notwithstanding the language and history
of Title VII,' 7 which was steeped in motive," the petitioners presented
10. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
11. Id. at 436.
12. Id. at 427.
13. Id. at 428.
14. Prior to the effective date of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Duke Power had
"openly discriminated on the basis of race in the hiring and assigning of employees." Griggs,
410 U.S. at 427. Moreover, Duke Power's requirement of a high school diploma and a passing
score on the objective tests, with their obvious potential for excluding black applicants, was
instituted for the first time on July 2, 1965, the effective date of Title VII. Griggs, 401 U.S. at
427-28.
15. Duke Power assisted undereducated minority workers in financing two-thirds of the
cost of tuition for high school training. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
16. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564 (1985).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-(17) (1988).
18. Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII makes it unlawful "for an employer ... to discriminate
19891
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the Supreme Court with an uncluttered, but not unique, problem'9 of
how to analyze ostensibly neutral selection devices that adversely af-
fect a class protected by the statute, absent proof of a racial motive.
The petitioners postulated that selection devices which are proven to
adversely affect a class protected by the statute violate the statute re-
gardless of the motives of the employers for using those devices.20
In addressing neutral selection devices in the context of a statute
dominated by a motive element for liability, at least five possible ap-
proaches were available to the Court: (1) motive must be proved by
the plaintiff; impact of a device is merely some evidence of that mo-
tive; (2) motive is a requirement of liability, but adverse impact of a
device shifts the burden of proving the lack of invidious motive to the
employer; (3) motive theoretically is necessary, but is a fiction estab-
lished through impact; the employer refutes the presumed motive by
establishing objective justifications for the device; (4) motive is not
necessary; liability is premised on impact without reference to motive,
but liability can be avoided by establishing objective justifications for
the device; and finally (5) motive is irrelevant; a device which has an
adverse impact is per se illegal without regard to any employer justifi-
cation.
The first option would require the plaintiff to prove the employer's
invidious motive in all cases. Adverse impact would be at most some
against any individual .. . because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin .... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (emphasis added). Section 703(a)(2) makes it unlawful
for an employer "to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any why which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (emphasis added). Use of the phrase
"because of" certainly suggests a requirement of motive. Further, improperly motivated dispa-
rate treatment "was the most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII."
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); see also Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1784 (1989).
19. The Court had wrestled over the same issue under a similarly worded National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982). See NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375
(1967); NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967); American Ship Bldg. Co. v.
NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963); see also infra
notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
20. The precise question presented by the Griggs petitioners was:
Whether the intentional use of psychological tests and related formal educational re-
quirements as employment criteria violates the race discrimination prohibition of Title
VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, where:
(1) the particular tests and standards used exclude Negroes at a high rate while having
a relatively minor effect in excluding whites, and
(2) these tests and standards are not related to the employer's jobs.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (No. 87-
1387).
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evidence of improper motive. The lower courts followed this option in
the Griggs litigation I.2
The second option is similar to the first in that actual motive is still
essential, but a showing of adverse impact by the plaintiff shifts the
burden of persuasion to the defendant to prove it used the device in
good faith. Any evidence, subjective or objective, could be used by
the defendant in an effort to convince the fact finder of its good faith.
Stated somewhat differently, adverse impact would establish an infer-
ence of improper motive to which the employer would have a defense
of good faith. 22
The third option would continue to require motive as an element of
liability, but motive would be addressed through legal fictions which
in turn would presume-not just infer-motive from objective facts.
However, unlike option two, where the employer can prevail by con-
vincing the fact finder of its subjective good faith, option three allows
the employer to refute plaintiff's prima facie case only by presenting
an objective business reason for using the exclusionary device. This
objective reason alone would be sufficient to refute the presumed mo-
tive. In the absence of an objective reason, the plaintiff would prevail
regardless of any good faith on the part of the employer. In such an
analysis, because motive is a factual issue, the greater the impact of a
device on a protected class the stronger the presumption that the result
was intended. Consequently, the strength of the employer's reasons
necessary to refute the presumed intent increases with the degree of
impact the challenged device has on the protected class. That is, the
greater the impact of the challenged device, the greater the employer's
need must be for using it.
The Court adopted this general approach to impact several years
prior to Griggs in the context of the National Labor Relations Act.23
Section 8(a)(3) of that Act, in language similar to Title VII, makes it
an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate "in regard to
hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment
to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. '24
This language had long been construed to require proof of the em-
21. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970), aff'g in part, 292 F.
Supp. 243 (M.D.N.C. 1968).
22. This option would treat proof of a device which adversely affects employment of mi-
norities as similar to proof of direct or statistical evidence that an employer in fact was improp-
erly motivated. Such a standard of proof shifts to the employer the burden of proving that it
would have made the same decision based on legitimate considerations. See Price Waterhouse,
109 S. Ct. at 1790.
23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-160 (1982).
24. Id. § 158(a)(3).
1989]
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ployer's motive behind the differential treatment of employees.25
When the Court was called upon to address the use of ostensibly neu-
tral reasons uniformly applied to all workers, such as an award of
extra seniority to all employees who continued working in the face of
a union-called strike, or the hiring of replacement workers by an em-
ployer who had locked-out union workers, the Court continued to rec-
ognize that motive was necessary to establish the employer's liability.2 6
The Court adopted the evidentiary concept that an actor is presumed
to intend the natural and foreseeable consequences of his actions.
Thus when a practice adopted by an employer in fact discourages pro-
tected activity, a court must presume that the employer desired or in-
tended to achieve that result. Once it was presumed that the employer
intended the result achieved by the device, the Court proceeded to an-
alyze the strength of the presumption. When the effect on employees'
rights was "comparatively slight," the initial presumption of illegal
motive was similarly light.2 7 This weak presumption of improper mo-
tive could be refuted "if the employer has come forward with evi-
dence of legitimate and substantial business justifications for the
conduct." ' 2 At this point, "an antiunion motivation must be proved
[by the charging party] to sustain the charge." ' 29 In sum, light impact
shifted to the employer a simple burden of presenting a legitimate, but
substantial, reason for using the device, which, if accomplished, dis-
solved the presumption of improper motive and required the plaintiff
to address the defendant's motive through conventional evidentiary
means.
When it could "reasonably be concluded that the employer's dis-
criminatory conduct was 'inherently destructive' of important em-
ployee rights, no proof of antiunion motivation was needed, and the
Board could find an unfair labor practice even if the employer intro-
25. See, e.g., American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311 (1965); Textile Work-
ers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 275-76 (1965); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp.,
373 U.S. 221, 227-28 (1963); Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 138 F.2d 86, 89 (3d Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 718 (1944).
As in a Title VII action, this motive can be established by direct evidence of an employer's
antiunion animus. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983). Motive
can also be established by circumstantial evidence of animus motivating particular treatment
suggested by the juxtaposition of protected activity and employer response. See Mueller Brass
Co. v. NLRB, 544 F.2d 815, 821-25 (5th Cir.) (Godbold, J., dissenting), reh'g denied, 548 F.2d
355 (1977); Edward G. BuddMfg. Co., 138 F.2d at 86.
26. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 109 S. Ct.
1225 (1989); Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. at 221; NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S.
87 (1957).
27. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967).
28. Id. (emphasis omitted).
29. Id.
[Vol. 17:1
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duced evidence that the conduct was motivated by business considera-
tions." 30 This created a heavy, perhaps insurmountable, burden to
justify the use of an inherently destructive device.3 Thus, when the
impact of the action on employee rights was great (as opposed to com-
paratively slight), the employer's burden was one of proving (as op-
posed to producing evidence of) an overpowering (as opposed to
legitimate) business reason for adopting the device.
Although the Court had adopted the labor relations model for ana-
lyzing impact some years prior to Griggs, this analysis was not pre-
sented to the Court in the petitioner's brief. No doubt the Court was
sympathetic to the plight of the petitioners and could foresee that even
good faith use of exclusionary devices would undermine the equal em-
ployment opportunity goal of Title VII. However, perhaps because
the Court had not been briefed on the labor relations approach to the
problem of impact, in Griggs the Court adopted option four, which
eliminated motive as a necessary element of Title VII liability:
[Title VII] proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The
touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which
operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job
performance, the practice is prohibited .... Congress directed the
thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not
simply the motivation.32
This holding resulted in a distinct and unique model of proof based
solely on impact and divorced totally from motive and the various
models developed by the Court to prove motive." This model was so
clean and potentially advantageous to civil rights plaintiffs that it has
30. Id.
31. An employer's economic survival may not even be a sufficient basis for using a device if
the impact on protected rights is sufficiently destructive. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373
U.S. 221 (1963); see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants,
109 S. Ct. 1225 (1989); NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967). Compare Ottawa
Silica Co. v. NLRB, 197 N.L.R.B. 449 (1972), enforced by, 482 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1973) (finding
conduct which was inherently destructive) with Inland Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 179 N.L.R.B. 350
(1969), enforced by, 440 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1971) (finding conduct which was comparatively
slight).
32. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32 (emphasis in original).
33. The various models of proof used to prove improper motivation are: (1) "direct evi-
dence-mixed motive," see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989); (2) "statisti-
cal-pattern or practice," see International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977); (3) "individual disparate treatment," see Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248 (1981); and (4) "perpetuation of past segregation," see Bazemore v. Friday, 478
U.S. 385 (1986). Each of these differs from the others and from the impact model outlined in
Griggs.
1989]
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been urged upon the Court as a basis of analyzing numerous other
statutory schemes.3 4
Traditionally, a Title VII Griggs impact case proceeded in two evi-
dentiary stages. The initial burden was on the plaintiff to prove to the
satisfaction of the fact finder that the practice operated to exclude
members of the class of which the plaintiff was a member-in short,
to prove that the device had an adverse impact on a protected class.35
Failure to prove this impact ended the litigation. The defendant car-
ried no obligation to justify the use of devices not shown to have ad-
verse consequences on a particular race, ethnic class, religion, or
gender.1
6
If the plaintiff successfully demonstrated the exclusionary effect of
the device on a class protected by Title VII, stage two of the litigation
was reached. At stage two, the employer's justification for using the
device which had an exclusionary or adverse effect on a protected
class was at issue. Griggs held that at this stage the burden shifted to
the employer to justify the device in terms of "business necessity." 37
Without defining the phrase "business necessity," the Griggs Court
stated that "Congress has placed on the employer the burden of show-
ing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to
the employment in question."38
1
34. Courts have considered applying the impact model of proof developed in Griggs to the
following statutory schemes: constitutional claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Person-
nel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976) (rejected as inconsistent with statutory purpose); race discrimination claims brought under
the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, see General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n. v. Pennsyl-
vania, 457 U.S. 375 (1982) (rejected as inconsistent with statutory history); claims brought under
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights, see Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582
(1983) (accepted as to prospective liability); the Rehabilitation Act protection of handicap, see
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985) (accepted in modified form); the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, see Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983)
(accepted); see also Player, Title VII Impact Analysis Applied to the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act: Is a Transplant Appropriate?, 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 1261 (1983).
35. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982); New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer,
440 U.S. 568 (1979). The amount of evidence required by Griggs, particularly regarding the
impact of the two objective achievement tests, was minimal, almost intuitive. See Griggs, 401
U.S. at 430 n.6.
36. See Teal, 457 U.S. at 440; Beazer, 440 U.S. at 568.
37. "What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary
barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of
racial or other impermissible classifications. .... The touchstone is business necessity." Griggs,
401 U.S. at 431 (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 432. Griggs also dealt with section 703(h) of Title VII, which ostensibly permits
employers to utilize any "professionally developed ability test ... not designed, intended or
used to discriminate because of race ...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). The Court held that this
proviso protected only job related tests. If the test had an exclusionary impact and was not "job
related," it was being "used to discriminate," and thus was outside the protection of the pro-
viso. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433-36. Thus, in effect, the testing proviso was rendered virtually su-
perfluous. It gave tests no more immunity than nontesting selection devices.
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The objective weight of the employer's burden was not clearly de-
fined by Griggs. However, one thing seemed clear: in evidentiary
terms, the burden on the employer was a burden of proof or persua-
sion. The employer had to prove to the satisfaction of the fact finder
the necessary "manifest relationship" between the device and bona
fide employer business purposes.3 9
In Griggs, the employer's proof of "business necessity" consisted
of testimony from a Duke Power executive that a high school diploma
and a passing score on the objective tests measured general ability and
were implemented to raise the general quality of the work force. 40 This
generalized, unsupported assumption, the Court held, fell far short of
proving the necessary "manifest relationship" between the screening
devices and actual employee performance. Thus, under Title VII, the
Court ruled that such devices were illegal. 41
II. THE WATSON PRELUDE TO WARDS COVE PACKING
In 1988, the Court in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust42 consid-
ered the narrow issue of whether the impact analysis model pioneered
in Griggs applies to subjective selection devices. The plaintiff, a black
female employee, had repeatedly been denied promotions by her em-
ployer, defendant Fort Worth Bank. In each case, the employer artic-
ulated a different subjective and facially neutral reason for the denial
of her request for promotion. 43 Ms. Watson argued that the subjective
system used by the defendant adversely affected the promotional op-
portunities of blacks at the Fort Worth Bank." However, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, consistent with its previous holding,45 held
39. The Court described the employer's burden as a "burden of showing." Griggs, 401
U.S. at 432. That would seem to be the same as a "burden of proving." A survey of the circuits
indicates that every circuit agreed. See Costa v. Markey, 677 F.2d 158 (1st Cir. 1982); Grant v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981); EEOC v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980); Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d
361 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981); Bunch v. Bullard, 795 F.2d 384 (5th Cir.
1986); Harless v. Duck, 619 F.2d 611 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 872 (1980); Liberles v.
County of Cook, 709 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 321 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 910 (1986); Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267 (9th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021 (1982); Williams v. Colorado Springs, 641 F.2d 835 (10th
Cir. 1981); Walker v. Jefferson County Home, 726 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1984); De Medina v.
Reinhardt, 686 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
40. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
41. Id.
42. 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988).
43. Id. at 2782.
44. Id.
45. See Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 673 F.2d 798 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 683
F.2d 417, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982); see also Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, (D.C. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 1115 (1985).
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that impact analysis was applicable only to identified objective de-
vices, such as pen-and-paper tests, educational credentials, physical
requirements, and the like.46
An eight-member Supreme Court unanimously reversed on the nar-
row issue presented, and remanded the case for consideration of the
plaintiff's proof of impact and, if necessary, for resolution of the suf-
ficiency of the employer's justification for using the subjective de-
vices. 47 The precise holding, however, was that if the plaintiff
established an adverse impact of the subjective selection system, 48 such
a system would be held to the same model of proof as applied to ob-
jective selection systems.4 9
This much seemed a victory for civil rights plaintiffs, but the Court
giveth and the Court taketh away. A four-Justice plurality opinion
written by Justice O'Connor continued beyond the narrow issue pre-
sented and provided for the guidance of the lower courts on remand a
"fresh and somewhat closer examination" of the impact model. 0 This
restated model emphasized the precision required to prove impact and
dramatically restated commonly accepted principles of the employer's
burden of proof after impact was proven by the plaintiff. Justice
O'Connor described the employer's burden not as one of persuading
the fact finder of the justification for use of an exclusionary device,
but one of merely presenting evidence of justification. Use of an ex-
clusionary device is justified, according to the Watson plurality, if the
employer presents evidence of "legitimate business reasons.""
The plurality appeared to equate the employer's burden in a Griggs
impact case with the burden of an employer in the motive-oriented
cases involving simple disparate treatment of minority and nonminor-
ity applicants. This suggested a shift from option four to option one.12
Impact on a protected class did nothing more than create a rebuttable
inference of improper motive that could be refuted simply by present-
ing evidence of legitimate business reasons.
46. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2783.
47. Id. at 2791.
48. Such impact would probably have to be established through "applicant flow" data.
This method analyzes the employer's own selection experience by comparing the percentage of
otherwise qualified black applicants who were selected with the percentage of qualified white
applicants who were selected. If the selection rates differed significantly, the subjectivity would
be said to have an adverse effect. See generally Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employ-
ment Testing: Statistical Proof Under Title VII, 91 HARv. L. REv. 793 (1978).
49. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2786-87.
50. Id. at 2788-91.
51. Id. at 2790.
52. See supra p. 6.
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In "disparate treatment" cases, which the plurality seemed to
equate with impact cases, the employer's motive is inferred by proof
that similarly situated persons from differently protected classes are
treated differently. An example of disparate treatment is when a qual-
ified minority person and a qualified nonminority person apply for a
vacancy and the nonminority person is selected. In such cases, the em-
ployer's proof is directed to the relatively weak inference of improper
motivation drawn from this proof of disparate treatment. This burden
merely requires the employer to articulate a specific and objective rea-
son for the plaintiff's rejection. 3
If the employer's burden upon proof of the adverse impact of a
selection device is no different from the employer's burden upon
proof that the employer had subjected the minority employee to dis-
parate treatment, the impact analysis as pioneered by Griggs would be
deprived of any significant viability apart from the motivational ap-
proaches to Title VII liability.14 If a majority of the Court adopted
this suggestion by the plurality, the consequences would be little short
of revolutionary, in that an employer's burden of refuting the weak
inference of motive flowing from simple disparate treatment would be
notoriously weak and relaxed. It is a rare employer which cannot ar-
ticulate some ostensibly rational reas6 n for rejecting a minority appli-
cant in favor of the white male applicant. Similarly, it would be a rare
case in which the employer could not articulate a legitimate reason for
using a particular selection device. Indeed, requiring an educational
credential "to secure a more intelligent work force" would seem to be
abstractly "legitimate." Such generalized rationality had been ex-
pressly rejected in Griggs.55 However, Watson appeared to sanction
such an approach, and thus effectively to undermine, if not overrule,
Griggs. This approach would grant an employer the maximum
amount of discretion to use devices which in fact exclude women and
minorities at the price of seriously undermining the employment op-
portunity goal of Title VII recognized in Griggs. This "dicta" in Wat-
son commanded only a plurality of the Court, and set the stage for
53. See United States Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983); Texas Dep't of Commu-
nity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981).
54. See Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2792 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy did not
participate in this decision. Justice Stevens concurred in the result, but found these aspects of the
plurality opinion unnecessary, and on this ground withheld comment. Justices Blackmun, Bren-
nan, and Marshall agreed with the holding that subjective devices should be subject to impact
analysis, but "dissented" from the "fresh" restatement of impact analysis, particularly as it
restated the employer's burden.
55. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
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further "clarification" of impact analysis, which was accomplished in
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. A tonio.16
III. WARDS COVE PACKING
Wards Cove Packing involved the alleged impact of various prac-
tices, some of them subjective, 7 adversely affecting the ability of mi-
nority workers in a cannery to move into noncannery positions with
the same employer.18 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs had proved the adverse im-
pact of these devices and that the employer had failed to carry its bur-
den of proving the "business necessity" of its selection system.5 9 The
Supreme Court reversed. Because the Court in Watson had unani-
mously confirmed that impact analysis could be used to evaluate sub-
jective devices such as those used in Wards Cove Packing, that point
was not at issue. The Court was unsatisfied, however, that the Wards
Cove Packing plaintiffs had sufficiently proved the adverse impact of
the subjective, informal selection system. The Court remanded the
case for evaluation of plaintiffs' proof.6° In the event the lower court
found that plaintiffs had established adverse impact, the Supreme
Court directed an evaluation of the "business necessity" of the chal-
lenged devices according to new, restated standards61 inspired by the
plurality in Watson. 62 Contrary to the Watson suggestion, however,
Wards Cove Packing retained the basic theory of the Griggs impact
analysis. It simply increased the threshold level of proof necessary to
prove impact, and decreased the burden on defendants to justify the
use of any device proved to have an adverse effect.
Wards Cove Packing made three major points. The first dealt with
the type and scope of evidence necessary to prove adverse impact. It
56. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
57. The hiring officers for Wards Cove Packing, when filling most job positions, generally
sought to hire individuals who were, "in the hiring officer's opinion, the best for the job."
Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 768 F.2d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 1985). Additionally, some
positions required comparable experience. For example, the position of dry tender engineer in-
cluded the required experience of one year with a related boat, or six months of engine mechani-
cal and one season of tender. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 827 F.2d 439, 446 (9th Cir.
1987). However, apparently such requirements for comparable experience were not mandatory
and could be waived by the hiring officer at his discretion. Id.
58. That subjective devices are subject to impact analysis was resolved by the Court in Wat-
son v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 108 S. Ct 2777 (1988). See supra notes 42-49 and accompa-
nying text.
59. Wards Cove Packing, 109 S. Ct. at 2120.
60. Id. at 2123-24.
.61. Id. at 2125-26.
62. See Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2777.
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confirmed prior authority that plaintiffs must prove adverse impact
with precision far beyond that suggested in Griggs.63
63. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff established the adverse impact of the employ-
er's hiring practices with regard to the noncannery jobs by comparing the high percentage of
minority workers (5207o) in the lower paying cannery jobs with the very low percentage of minor-
ity workers (15-1707o) in the higher paying, more desirable noncannery positions. Wards Cove
Packing, 109 S. Ct. at 2122. The Supreme Court first held that such "snap shot" data showing a
simple racial imbalance between cannery and noncannery workers were insufficient to prove im-
pact. While simple imbalance may prove a pattern or practice of improper motive, International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Hazelwood School Dist. v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977), to prove the impact of a device the plaintiff must identify the device
and show the effect of this device on a protected class. Wards Cove Packing, 109 S. Ct. at 2121.
This conclusion is intuitively correct. See 3 LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 74.41
(1987); see also Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
The Court then held that the plaintiffs had failed to refine their potential applicant pool data
to include only those persons who were interested and qualified for the positions but were alleg-
edly excluded by the devices. Wards Cove Packing, 109 S. Ct. at 2121-22. Justice White had
made this argument in his dissent in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 348 (1977) (White, J.,
dissenting), the principle was accepted in a somewhat different context in Hazelwood School
District, 433 U.S. at 308 n.13, and in New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568,
585-87 (1979), and ultimately this requirement was adopted in impact cases, see, e.g., Valentino
v. United States Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 56 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Pack v. Energy Research & Dev.
Admin., 566 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1977). The courts have even used an applicant's assumed lack
of interest in the job to refine such data. EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249 (6th Cir.
1988).
Next the Court held that use of the applicant pool was too narrow because data from a uni-
verse different from which the employer recruited applicants was inherently unreliable. Specifi-
cally, the employer recruited noncannery workers from the general area population, not just
from cannery workers. Thus, a pool that evaluated only cannery workers was underinclusive.
Wards Cove Packing, 109 S. Ct. at 2123. This principle had also been recognized in Hazelwood
School District, 433 U.S. at 299, and is generally followed in the lower courts, e.g., Markey v.
Tenneco Oil Co., 707 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1983); Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665 F.2d 918
(9th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. United Va. Bank, 615 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980). This restriction has
even been applied, precisely as in Wards Cove Packing, to the practice of using lower-level jobs
as a comparative base for the under representation at higher levels. See O'Brien v. Sky Chefs,
Inc., 670 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1982).
Finally, the Court indicated that if the defendant had reliable applicant flow data, this would
generally prevail over any proof by the plaintiff drawn from the impact of the device on a poten-
tial applicant pool. Wards Cove Packing, 109 S. Ct. at 2121-22. This, too, was generally ac-
cepted dicta. In Hazelwood School District, 433 U.S. at 299, the Court had suggested a
preference for actual data from an employer's experience over comparisons to the potential ap-
plicant pool. See also Paxton v. Union Nat'l Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 564 (8th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1083 (1983); Movement for Opportunity & Equality v. General Motors Corp.,
622 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1980); 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4 (1988).
While the Court confirmed that the plaintiff had the duty of "fine tuning" data, Wards Cove
Packing, 109 S. Ct. at 2124-25, this duty was not originally imposed by Griggs or by Dothard.
These cases permitted the most generalized proof to create a prima facie case of impact and "[i]f
the employer discerns fallacies or deficiencies in the data offered by the plaintiff, he is free to
adduce countervailing evidence of his own." Dothard, 433 U.S. at 331. This burden was shifted
from the defendant to the plaintiff in Beazer, 440 U.S. at 568. Thus, it was Beazer, not Wards
Cove Packing, that shifted the burden of proof to the plaintiff to prove impact with a greater
mathematical precision. This allowed a defendant to prevail by simply raising potential defects in
the plaintiff's data without presenting countervailing evidence.
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The second point of Wards Cove Packing was the definition, or
rather redefinition, of "business necessity." While the Court had
never clearly defined "business necessity," the Wards Cove Packing
clarification produced a definition akin to "substantial business justi-
fication." 64 This definition does not expressly conflict with any prior
pronouncements from the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, it will change
how "business necessity" is articulated in virtually all circuits.
Finally, regardless of Justice White's condescending statement that
we should have understood otherwise, 65 Wards Cove Packing in fact
reversed eighteen years of uniformly accepted construction of earlier
Supreme Court decisions that placed on employers the ultimate bur-
den of justifying any device proved to adversely affect the employ-
ment opportunities of a protected class. This new burden on
employers was one of simply presenting evidence of "business neces-
sity" which, if accomplished, shifted the burden back to the plaintiff
to prove that "business necessity" did not exist. This shift of the bur-
den of persuasion away from the defendant to the plaintiff requires
fundamental rethinking of all impact cases resolved on the basis that
the defendant failed to carry its burden of proof.
A. When is an Exclusionary Device Unlawful? The Meaning of
"Business Necessity"
One of the first substantive issues addressed under Title VII was
how to analyze devices adopted after July 2, 1965, the effective date
of Title VII, when the devices were race-neutral on their face, and
even race-neutral in terms of motivation, but perpetuated the facial
segregation practiced by the employer prior to July 2, 1965. For exam-
ple, in one case a trucking company had two categories of drivers; the
more desirable category of jobs was filled exclusively by whites, while
the less desirable category was staffed predominately by blacks. This
division continued up until the effective date of Title VII. After July
1965 the company filled vacancies in both job catagories without re-
gard to race. The company also prohibited all employees from trans-
ferring from one job to another, a practice that continued after the
effective date of Title VII. This "no transfer" policy was neutral in
64. Wards Cove Packing, 109 S. Ct. at 2125-26.
65. Justice White stated:
We acknowledge that some of our earlier decisions can be read as suggesting other-
wise. But to the extent that those cases speak of an employers' 'burden of proof' with
respect to a legitimate business justification defense, they should have been under-
stood to mean an employer's production-but not persuasion-burden.
Id. at 2126 (citations omitted).
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appearance and uniformly imposed on all employees for business pur-
poses. Obviously, however, a rule prohibiting transfers between units
would perpetuate the initial segregation of black and white employees
into those separate jobs. 66
Even in the absence of any proof of racial motivation, rules which
perpetuated racial segregation were held by courts to violate Title VII
unless the employer carried the burden of proving the "business ne-
cessity" of the rule. 67 It was in this context that the term and concept
of "business necessity" was coined.
According to this perpetuation-premised, pre-Griggs definition,
"business necessity" was construed literally to mean "essential" or
"absolutely required." ' 68 More fully explained: "the business purpose
must be sufficiently compelling to override any racial impact; the
challenged practice must effectively carry out the business purpose
... and there must be available no acceptable alternative policies or
practices which would better accomplish the business purpose ad-
vanced. "169
It was this literal concept of "business necessity" that the petition-
ers in Griggs asked the Court to adopt and apply to factors having an
adverse impact on protected classes. 70 It is reasonable to assume,
therefore, that the Court had in mind a similar conception of the term
when it used these same words to define the employer's burden. 71 Ac-
cordingly, many lower courts justifiably concluded that in using the
66. See Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 954 (1971). In another case, a union, which previously had excluded blacks, abolished
its express racial exclusionary provision, but continued to admit only relatives of current mem-
bers. Obviously, a policy of admitting only relatives, who by no coincidence were all white,
necessarily worked to exclude blacks. Local 53, Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbes-
tos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
67. See e.g., Beavers v. International Ass'n of Bridge & Structural Ironworkers, Local Un-
ion No. 1, 701 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1982); Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d at 245 (no-
transfer rule improperly perpetuated initial discriminatory assignment); Vogler, 407 F.2d at
1047.
68. This literal interpretation of "necessity" and "necessary" is in line with their dictionary
definitions. "Necessity" is defined as "the quality or state or fact of being necessary: as a condi-
tion arising out of circumstances that compels to a certain course of action ... inevitableness,
unavoidable; great or absolute need." WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1511
(1986). "Necessary" is defined as "unavoidable, inevitable . . . that must be by reason of the
nature of things . . . that cannot be done without . . . that must be done or had ... absolutely
required . . . essential, indispensable." Id. at 1510-11.
69. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971) (footnotes omitted); see
also Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d at 248-49; Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc. 279 F.
Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
70. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)
(No. 87-1387).
71. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
1989]
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term "business necessity" in Griggs, the Court was adopting the pre-
existing, literal definition of the term.7 2
The Griggs Court did, however, state more specifically that "Con-
gress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any
given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employ-
ment in question. ' 73 This obviously suggests that, in the context of
adverse impact (as opposed to practices which perpetuate pre-Act im-
properly motivated segregation), the employer's burden is something
less than proving "necessity" but entails proving only a manifest rela-
tionship to the employment in question.
The Court in Griggs thus gave conflicting signals as to the meaning
of "business necessity" and launched the concept of impact analysis
into a sea of ambiguity. On one hand, the Court stated that the
"touchstone is business necessity." ' 74 This indicated that the Court
would require the employer to prove that the device was "essential"
as previously defined by the lower courts in perpetuation cases. On
the other hand, the Court indicated that the employer was obligated
to prove only that the device was "manifestly related" to the job or
job performance. 75 This ambiguity essentially remained unanswered
for the eighteen years between Griggs and Wards Cove Packing.
1. The Employer's Burden From Griggs to Watson: Albemarle
Paper, Dothard, and Beazer
In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,7 6 the Court's first impact case
after Griggs, the Supreme Court addressed the validity of a widely
used pen-and-paper aptitude test as a basis for selecting employees. 77
The employer engaged a testing expert to conduct a post-challenge
evaluation of the tests to determine the actual relationship between
72. See, e.g., Kinsey v. First Regional Sec., Inc., 557 F.2d 830, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Pett-
way v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 245-47 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 494 F.2d
1296 (1974); United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco R.R., 464 F.2d 301, 308 (8th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973).
73. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. The Court explained that "[i]f an employment practice which
operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is
prohibited." Id. at 431 (emphasis added). "[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent
does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in head-
winds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability." Id. at 432 (emphasis
added). "Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given require-
ment must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question." Id. (emphasis in origi-
nal). "What Congress has commanded is that any tests used must measure the person for the job
and not the person in the abstract." Id. at 436.
74. Id. at 431.
75. Id. at 424.
76. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
77. ld.at410-11.
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test performance and job performance. 7 The litigation produced
proof by the plaintiffs that the test adversely affected the employment
of black applicants in that blacks failed the test at a significantly
higher rate than white applicants. 79 This finding was not challenged.
Rather, the employer responded with the expert's testimony which
concluded that the tests were widely adopted tests which measured to
some degree the performance of workers on the job. 0 The Court
found that the employer's proof was inadequate and did not establish
a "manifest relationship" between the tests and actual job perform-
ance.8 ' Specifically, the Court determined that the underlying statisti-
cal correlations between test scores and actual job performance were
flawed because they did not meet professional standards of statistical
validation adopted by the American Psychological Association.82
In this context the Court adopted the term "manifest relationship,"
as opposed to "business necessity," to define the employer's burden.
However, the Court applied- the "manifest relationship" concept in
such a way that the employer's burden approached one of demon-
strating "necessity" for use of the device.83 The Court rejected the
unsupported expert conclusions,84 declared the general popular use of
the device irrelevant, 5 and demanded a strong showing of a precise
statistical relationship between performance on the test and actual job
performance. 86 Further, the Court recited the need to use professional
standards of test validation to prove the required "manifest relation-
ship." 8 7
Significantly, however, Albemarle Paper did not demand that the
employer prove the absence of any lesser discriminatory alternative to
the device or test being challenged. The Court recognized the impor-
tance of evidence showing an effective alternative that has less of an
adverse impact on plaintiff's class, but placed the burden of present-
ing such viable alternatives upon the plaintiff.8 8 Moreover, even if the
plaintiff presented alternatives that the defendant could have used to
select employees, plaintiff's proof raised the issue of the employer's
78. Id. at 411, 429-30.
79. Id. at 411.
80. Id. at 412-13.
81. Id. at 433.
82. American Psychological Association, Standards for Educational and Psychological
Tests and Manuals (1966); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(a) (1988); 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.5A (1988).
83. Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 435.
84. Id. at 430.
85. Id. at 428 n.23.
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motive for adopting the challenged test. When an employer used a
device having an adverse impact on minority applicants, when an
equally effective alternative existed which did not have a similar im-
pact, an inference that the employer was improperly motivated was
created. Consequently, evidence of lesser discriminatory alternatives
did not prove the absence of the challenged device's "business neces-
sity." Thus a plaintiff who proved that such an alternative existed did
not prevail as a matter of law. The lesser discriminatory alternative
only suggested the presence of illegal motive for the use of the device,
which triggered a new inquiry into the employer's motivation.8 9
Albemarle Paper thus construed "business necessity" to require an
extremely demanding level of proof: the demonstration of a clear and
unambiguous relationship between the selection device and actual job
performance. However, because the presence of alternatives would
not entitle the plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law, the "business
necessity" burden did not really mean "necessary" or "essential" in
any absolute or literal sense. The "manifest relationship" aspect of
Griggs seemed to control over the "business necessity" suggestions. 9°
Two years later in Dothard v. Rawlinson,91 the Court refused to
accept a 5 '2'' minimum height requirement and a 120-pound mini-
mum weight requirement as being "manifestly related" to the job of
prison guard. The Court found that these two physical requirements
had a significant impact on employment opportunities of women. The
employer, however, identified its goal of securing guards with
strength, and argued that minimum height and weight had a manifest
relationship to the required strength and thus to bona fide business
purposes. 92 The Court accepted that physical strength was a valid
89. The Court explained that "[i]f an employer does meet the burden of proving that its
tests are 'job related,' it remains open to the complaining party to show that other tests or
selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's
legitimate interest in 'efficient and trustworthy workmanship."' Id. at 425. The Court was un-
clear as to the significance of this evidence. It was not sure whether this objectively proved the
lack of "business necessity" for the challenged device, or whether it was simply some evidence
that the device was utilized for an improper motive. The Court's statement that "[s]uch a show-
ing would be evidence that the employer was using its tests merely as a 'pretext' for discrimina-
tion" suggests that a lesser discriminatory alternative was not a part of "business necessity," but
demonstrates improper motive behind the use of the device. Id.
90. A year after Albemarle Paper, the Court in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976),
appeared to relax the Albemarle Paper demand of stringent proof of "business necessity"
through scientific "validation" by permitting a "sensible construction of the job-relatedness re-
quirement." Washington, 426 U.S. at 251. A correlation between test scores and job perform-
ance was not required if the test predicted success on a training program and appeared rationally
to relate to some aspects of the content of the ultimate job. Id. at 252.
91. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
92. Id. at 331.
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component of the prison guard job but concluded that there was "no
evidence correlating the height and weight requirements with the req-
uisite amount of strength thought essential to good job perform-
ance." 93 Because of the lack of underlying data necessary to prove a
correlation between the exclusionary rule (height and weight minima)
and a necessary requirement of the job (strength), the defendant failed
to establish that physical size for a prison guard was "necessary" to
successfully perform the job. Although a minimum physical size for a
guard may be intuitively rational, it did not meet the high standard of
a "business necessity."
Significantly, Dothard revisited the role of lesser discriminatory al-
ternatives and noted that "[i]f the employer proves that the challenged
requirements are job related, the plaintiff may then show that other
selection devices without a similar discriminatory effect would also
'serve the employer's legitimate interest . . . ."'94 This suggests, con-
trary to Albemarle Paper, that if a plaintiff succeeded in establishing
such an alternative, it would disprove the defendant's assertion of
"business necessity" and would entitle the plaintiff to prevail without
any further inquiry into the employer's motivation. 95
The "business necessity" aspects of the burden created in Griggs
now seemed to prevail over the "manifest relationship" standard. At
this stage "business necessity" seemed to mean, literally, "essential."
Two years after Dothard, and eight years after Griggs, this emerg-
ing yet still ill-defined concept of "business necessity" was thrown
into disarray by New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer.96 Plain-
tiffs were challenging the broad application of a "no narcotics" rule
to persons in non-safety sensitive positions who had been undergoing
narcotics rehabilitation treatment for more than one year. 97 The deci-
sion was initially resolved on constitutional grounds, 98 and further dis-
posed of on the basis that plaintiffs' proof failed to establish the
impact of this narrow application of the "no narcotics" rule on racial
93. Id.
94. Id. at 329 (citation omitted).
95. Some lower courts have not followed the suggestion in Dothard that the burden of
proving the viability of the alternative was on the plaintiff. They have held that the burden of
coming forward with, or presenting evidence of, alternatives was on the plaintiff. However, once
such evidence was presented, the employer carried the ultimate burden of proving "necessity" of
a device, and also of proving that any proposed alternatives were not viable. See, e.g., Gutierrez
v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1042 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot, 109 S. Ct. 1736
(1989). EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318, 331 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 910
(1986).
96. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
97. Id. at 578.
98. See id. at 582-83 & nn.22-23.
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minorities.99 However, in a brief footnote the Court gratuitously com-
mented that the employer's goals were "significantly served by-even
if they do not require-[the employer's] rule . . . .The record thus
demonstrates that [the employer's] rule bears a 'manifest relationship
to the employment in question." ' 1° However, the record accepted by
the Court contained no evidence that persons enrolled in drug rehabil-
itation programs for more than a year presented a greater risk of drug
abuse than persons drawn at random from the general public not in
such programs. I0 The rule was sustained simply because it was "ra-
tional." As pointed out by the dissent, there was certainly no showing
of job relatedness of the kind previously demanded in Griggs, Albe-
marie Paper, and Dothard.10 2
The footnote in Beazer may have been merely ill-advised dicta, or
perhaps the Court really meant what it said, or seemed to say-that
"necessity" meant "rational."' ' 0° As might be expected, the lower fed-
eral courts were in a frenzy of disharmony, their only unity being that
of ignoring Beazer's footnote thirty-one. Some courts emphasized the
"manifest relationship" aspects of Griggs, and others gave a more lit-
eral construction to the word "necessity."' 04 An oversimplified, but
99. See id. at 587.
100. Id. at 587 n.31.
101. Indeed, the evidence indicated that a random selection of employees from the popula-
tion would produce the same percentage of drug abusers as would employees drawn from a pool
of persons who had been in a rehabilitation program for more than one year. Id. at 586 & n.28.
102. Id. at 602 (White, J., dissenting).
103. The Court was primarily concerned with the lower court's holding that the discrimina-
tion against those in drug rehabilitation programs was unconstitutional. Id. at 587-93. Discus-
sion of Title VII was secondary, and was addressed largely to determine whether plaintiffs were
entitled to statutory attorneys' fees. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 568. The thrust of the Court's opinion
dealing with Title VII was directed toward the failure of plaintiff to prove adverse impact. See
Beazer, 440 U.S. at 584-86. Consequently, the comment on "business necessity" was at most an
alternative holding, but probably dicta. Further, the Court suggested that perhaps its relaxed
view of the employer's burden was premised on, at best, a weak showing of impact. See id. at
587.
104. For example, the Ninth Circuit did not know what to make of all of this. See, e.g.,
Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021
(1982); Craig v. County of Los Angeles, 626 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919
(1981); Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928
(1980); deLaurier v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 588 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1978). The Tenth
Circuit had similar problems. See, e.g., Williams v. Colorado Springs, 641 F.2d 835 (10th Cir.
1981). The Sixth Circuit was troubled as well. See Rowe v. Cleveland Pnuematic Co., 690 F.2d
88, 93-94 (6th Cir. 1982); Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1260-62 (6th
Cir. 1981).
Many courts simply ignored Beazer, and continued to apply a stringent version of "business
necessity." See, e.g., EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318, 331 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 910 (1986); Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 371 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981); see also Caviale v. State of Wis., Dep't of Health and Soc. Servs.,
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relatively accurate, summary Of the lower court developments over the
intervening nine years was that:
[a]lthough differing as to the precise terminology, the lower courts
agree that "business necessity" contains three elements: (1) a
substantial employer interest; (2) a close or "manifest" relationship
between the employer's interest and the challenged criteria, a
relationship that demands factual proof; and (3) no alternative
practice that would serve the employer equally well with less of a
discriminatory effect.
... If the plaintiff presents evidence of the existence of lesser
discriminatory alternatives, the employer must establish the
"necessity" for the practice. 05
2. Watson and Wards Cove Packing
The Court's next attempt at defining the employer's burden in an
impact case came in the plurality opinion of Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank and Trust.'°6 In Watson, four Justices agreed to take a "fresh"
look at "business necessity,"' 07 and in so doing, embraced a version
unlike any used in the lower courts. This standard was reminiscent of
Beazer's long-ignored (if not forgotten) footnote thirty-one. Indeed,
the plurality went even further than Beazer, suggesting that "neces-
sity" was no more than a "legitimate reason." 08 The burden of prov-
ing "necessity" would be the same as proving the light-to-nonexistent
burden carried by employers when a weak inference of improper mo-
tive is created by a plaintiff proving simply disparate treatment of
similarly situated minority and nonminority applicants.' °9
744 F.2d 1289 (7th Cir. 1984); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n., 630 F.2d 79 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981). See generally Note, Employment Discrimination-
Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case and Defendant's Rebuttal in a Disparate Impact Case, 54 TuL. L.
REv. 1187 (1980).
105. M. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 5.41 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
106. 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988).
107. See supra text accompanying note 50.
108. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2786-87.
109. The Watson Court stated:
The distinguishing features of the factual issues that typically dominate in disparate
impact cases do not imply that the ultimate legal issue is different than in cases where
disparate treatment analysis is used. Nor do we think it is appropriate to hold a defen-
dant liable for unintentional discrimination on the basis of less evidence than is re-
quired to prove intentional discrimination. Rather, the necessary premise of the
disparate impact approach is that some employment practices, adopted without a de-
liberately discriminatory motive, may in operation be functionally equivalent to inten-
19891
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The Watson plurality then articulated this "fresh" definition of
"necessity," which would allow the defendant to meet its burden by
simply "producing evidence that its employment practices are based
on legitimate business reasons." 10 It is indeed "fresh" to redefine the
English language.",' The Watson plurality then indicated that the em-
ployer had no obligation to justify use of exclusionary devices through
formal "validation studies," as had been required in Albemarle Paper
and Dothard, which seek to determine whether discrete selection crite-
ria predict actual on-the-job performance."l2
The plurality of Watson evolved into a five-to-four majority in
Wards Cove Packing."3 In addressing the definition of "business ne-
cessity" the Court, while still not accepting that "necessity" means
what it says (i.e., essential or indispensible), 1 4 nonetheless backed
away significantly from the Watson plurality, which found no signifi-
cant difference between impact and motive cases. The Court defined
the weight of the employer's burden to be distinctly more weighty
than merely articulating a rational reason for use of the device:
tional discrimination.
Id. at 2785 (citation omitted).
In disparate treatment cases the employer's burden is to "articulate some legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for the employee's rejection." McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802 (1973). For similar language see Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981). This burden requires the employer to do more than produce evidence of
a relatively specific reason that is sufficiently rational to carry an inference that the reason,
rather than the race of the individual, could have motivated the decision. See generally Player,
Defining "Legitimacy" in Disparate Treatment Cases: Motivational Inferences as a Talisman for
Analysis, 36 MERCER L. REV. 855 (1985); Player, The Evidentiary Nature of Defendant's Burden
in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 49 Mo. L. REv. 17 (1984). Reasons that are extremely
light, transient, and subjective will carry this inference. For example, in Furnco Construction
Corporation v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978), the fact that the employer did not know the plain-
tiff, but knew the white applicant, was a "legitimate" reason that carried the employer's eviden-
tiary burden. In Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55, the existence of "personality conflicts" between
the female discharged and co-workers was a "legitimate reason." A "legitimate reason" sus-
tained in United States Postal Service v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983), was an exercise of
discretionary, subjective judgment as to which employee was best suited for the promotion. See
also Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 825-26 (4th Cir. 1989) (friendship and nepotism of
whites with other whites is "legitimate" basis for rejecting a black applicant).
110. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2790.
111. Legitimate is defined as "lawfully begotten ... genuine . . . conforming to recognized
principles or accepted rules and standards . . . reasonable." WEBSTER's TIRD NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY 1291 (1986). See also supra note 68.
112. Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2790.
113. Justice Kennedy, who had not participated in Watson, joined with the Watson plurality
to form the five-Justice majority. Justice Stevens, who had abstained from the debate in Wat-
son, joined Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Marshall who had objected in Watson to the revi-
sion of impact analysis. Justice White wrote for the majority, Justice Stevens for the dissent.
114. See supra note 68.
[Vol. 17:1
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[T]he dispositive issue [in an impact case] is whether a challenged
practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate goals of the
employer .... A mere insubstantial justification in this regard will
not suffice .... At the same time, though, there is no requirement
that the challenged practice be "essential" or "indispensible" to the
employer's business . . . 5
"Necessity" clearly does not mean "essential," as suggested in Do-
thard, but it does impose a burden of some significant justification.
Employer goals must be "legitimate," that is, related to employment,
and the practice must serve those goals in a "significant way."
The Court's emphasis that "insubstantial" justifications will not
suffice retreats from the Watson plurality and Beazer's footnote
thirty-one,' 16 both of which suggest that any legitimate or rational rea-
son is adequate. Importantly, Wards Cove Packing does not indicate
that impact is a proxy for, or the functional equivalent of, evidence of
illegal motive. This silence is significant. Contrary to the Watson plu-
rality, the employer's burden of justifying a device having adverse
consequences is significantly heavier than the level of the employer's
burden to refute an inference of improper motive drawn from simple
disparate treatment.
The Watson plurality seemed to reject any obligation on employers
to present statistical validation of selection devices, a core part of the
required "manifest relationship" proof in Albemarle Paper, Dothard,
and the Uniform Guidelines. 117 Wards Cove Packing, however, was
silent as to whether an employer's burden to present evidence that the
115. Wards Cove Packing, 109 S. Ct. at 2125-26 (citation omitted). Ironically, this is pre-
cisely how the dictionary defines "necessary." See supra note 68.
116. Ironically, the author of Beazer and the famous footnote thirty-one was Justice Stevens,
author of the dissent in Wards Cove Packing. One might speculate as to whether Justice Stevens
has any regrets over his loose pen. Additionally, Justice White, who dissented in Beazer, latched
onto this ill-advised footnote in Wards Cove Packing, using it as justification to reject placing
the "necessity" burden on employers. See Wards Cove Packing, 109 S. Ct. at 2125-26. In Be-
azer, Justice White attacked Justice Stevens' finding of no impact, and argued that defendants
have not come close to showing that the present rule is "demonstrably a reasonable
measure of job performance." No one could reasonably argue petitioners have made
the kind of showing demanded by Griggs or Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody .... By
defendant's own stipulation, this employment barrier was adopted "without meaning-
ful study of its relationship to job-performance ability."
Beazer, 440 U.S. at 602 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Clearly, Justice White was
rejecting Justice Stevens' footnote thirty-one. Now, ten years later in Wards Cove Packing,
Justice White embraces the footnote as if it were holy writ. Could it be that Justice Stevens was
persuaded by Justice White's dissent in Beazer, and Justice White, after pondering Justice Stev-
ens' Beazer footnote thirty-one, in Wards Cove Packing finally accepted the wisdom abandoned
by Justice Stevens?
117. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.3, 1607.5, 1607.6 (1988).
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challenged practice significantly serves the legitimate employment
goals of the employer includes, whenever practical, proof by profes-
sionally acceptable validation data.
This silence in Wards Cove Packing suggests that Watson, which
addressed the impact of a subjective system, was merely cautioning
that subjective systems, unlike objective systems, need not be profes-
sionally validated. That is, validation may work fine with objective
tests that are capable of being objectively studied and measured, but
because validation is difficult to apply to subjectivity, it should not be
required for subjective selection devices. 1 ' Moreover, if the Court was
going to reject the concept of validation, long accepted by the en-
forcement agencies," 9 and overrule Albemarle Paper,20 which specifi-
cally endorsed the concept, one would have assumed that the Court
would have done so in express language, and not merely by failing to
comment on the Watson plurality.
Therefore, in light of the more stringent definition of the employ-
er's burden in Wards Cove Packing, the Watson commentary reject-
ing an obligation to present validation studies should be limited to the
facts before the Watson Court: purely subjective selection systems.
Traditional obligations of validation, where practical, should for the
time being remain a critical part of the defendant's burden.
Clearly, the concept of "business necessity" is not what it was in
the days preceding Griggs, when "necessity" meant what it said: "es-
sential." But as bad as Wards Cove Packing is from the perspective of
plaintiffs, it could have been worse. The Court could have adopted
the "impact-as-a-proxy-for-motive inference" thesis of Watson; it did
not. The Court could have rejected the use of professional validation;
it did not. The Court could have adopted a simple legitimacy standard
for the justification of exclusionary practices; it did not.
B. The Role of "Lesser Discriminatory Alternatives"
The precise role of lesser discriminatory alternatives in justifying
devices which have an adverse impact has never been clear. Albemarle
Paper and Dothard recognized the relevancy of this element, and
agreed that the employer had no initial burden to prove the absence of
viable alternatives-the burden of presenting evidence of the existence
of alternatives was upon the plaintiff. However, as pointed out
118. See Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 697 F.2d 810, 815-16 (8th Cir. 1983) (recognizing
that a validation study is the preferred type of evidence in a disparate impact case, but unwilling
to hold that such studies are always required).
119. Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (1978), 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1988).
120. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
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above,' 2' the effect on the analysis of the plaintiff's presentation of
such alternatives was unclear. Viable alternatives to the challenged de-
vice could establish that the device was unnecessary and thus unjusti-
fied. Logically, if the employer must prove that a device is in fact
"'necessary" (as defined in the dictionary to mean "essential"), proof
that alternatives exist establishes that the device is not "necessary" or
''essential. 122
Alternatively, as indicated by Albemarle Paper, the defendant's
proof of "manifest relationship" could be considered sufficient to
carry its burden, with existence of an alternative merely being some
evidence that the device was being used for improper purposes. The
last business necessity case prior to Watson, New York City Transit
Authority v. Beazer,123 did not mention the concept of lesser discrimi-
natory alternatives as it cryptically stated the nature of "business ne-
cessity" in footnote thirty-one.124 But the Court closed by stating that
"[t]he District Court's express finding that the rule was not motivated
by racial animus forecloses any claim in rebuttal that it was merely a
pretext for intentional discrimination." 2  This suggests, quite clearly,
that proof of lesser discriminatory alternatives is not part of "business
necessity," but is relevant only to prove the motive of the employer
for imposing the standard.
Finally, perhaps because the issue was never presented prior to
Wards Cove Packing, the Court failed to identify which party had the
ultimate burden of persuading the fact finder of the existence or non-
existence of any alternatives once the plaintiff presented evidence of
an alternative. 2 6 The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Pro-
cedures placed that burden on the employer,'27 as did many courts.12
Watson was ambiguous as to the role of lesser discriminatory alter-
natives. 2 9 Wards Cove Packing, however, held unambiguously that
the implication to be drawn from Beazer was accurate:
121. See supra notes 76-95 and accompanying text.
122. This was clearly the position of the pre-Griggs cases, see, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard
Corp., 444 F.2d. 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971), and some post-Griggs constructions of Griggs, see,
e.g., Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1297-98 (8th Cir. 1975).
123. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
124. See supra notes 100-16 and accompanying text.
125. Beazer, 440 U.S. at 587.
126. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
127. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1988).
128. See, e.g., EEOC v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318, 332-33 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 910 (1986).
129. For example the Watson Court stated:
the plaintiff must "show that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly unde-
sirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate interest in efficient and
1989]
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[B]y so demonstrating [a lesser discriminatory alternative, plaintiffs]
would prove that [defendants] were using their tests merely as a
"pretext" for discrimination. If [plaintiffs], having established a
prima facie case, come forward with alternatives to [defendants']
hiring practices that reduce the racially-disparate impact of practices
currently being used, and [defendants] refuse to adopt these
alternatives, such a refusal would belie a claim by [defendants] that
their incumbent practices are being employed for nondiscriminatory
reasons.13 0
This is perfectly consistent with the Court's abandonment of the
concept of "necessity." If all that is required for a neutral factor to
be legal is that it serve an employer's purpose, then the role of lesser
discriminatory alternatives must be simply one of proving pretextual
motive for the adoption of the device.
Unfortunately, the Court went further. It indicated that only after
the employer has been informed of the alternative, and has refused to
adopt the alternative, would the employer's motive become an issue. 3'
Of course, if the employer were actually aware of the impact of the
device used, and knew of an equally effective, but less discriminatory
device, yet refused to implement such an alternative on request, such
behavior would be virtually conclusive evidence of improper motive.
However, this does not require total rejection of proof of lesser dis-
criminatory alternatives of which the employer should reasonably
have known. Such evidence could create an inference of an employer's
improper motive for adopting the device with the exclusionary ef-
fect. 132
The viability of "lesser discriminatory alternatives" as a liability
producing concept was further bled by the Court's notation that an
employer can raise the cost of using an alternative as a bona fide rea-
son for use of the device having a discriminatory effect.' The Court
further offered a gratuitous comment implying that discriminatory al-
ternatives will be established only upon what amounts to clear and
trustworthy workmanship." The same factors would also be relevant in determining
whether the challenged practice has operated as the functional equivalent of a pretext
for a discriminatory treatment.
Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2790 (citations omitted).
130. Wards Cove Packing, 109 S. Ct. at 2126-27 (citation omitted).
131. Id.
132. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978).
133. "'[Flactors such as the cost or other burdens of proposed alternative selection devices
are relevant in determining whether they would be equally as effective as the challenged practice
in serving the employer's legitimate business goals."' Wards Cove Packing Co., 109 S. Ct. at
2127 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2790 (1988)).
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convincing evidence.'3 4 This, coupled with the direction that lower
courts are to view suggestions of alternatives with suspicion,'35 virtu-
ally insures that only the most intrepid trial judge would dare find
that an employer was improperly motivated based on the argument
that the employer could have, but refused to, accept selection devices
proposed by the plaintiff.
C. The Evidentiary Nature of the Burden: "Production" or
"Persuasion "
Properly motivated use of devices which have business "legiti-
macy," as opposed to business "necessity," will not violate Title VII.
The problem, however, is which party has the burden of establishing
that the "challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the legiti-
mate employment goals of the employer." 136
Notwithstanding a cryptic closing comment in Beazer's infamous
footnote thirty-one,'3 7 the lower courts' and the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission 39 agreed that when the plaintiff
proved the adverse impact of a particular device, the employer's
burden in establishing "business necessity" was one of proof-of
persuading the fact finder of the justification for using the exclu-
sionary device.' 40 While none of the Court's prior cases addressing
impact stated unambiguously that the defendant's burden in re-
sponding to proof of impact was that of persuasion,' 4' it was the
134. "'Courts are generally less competent than employers to restructure business practices,'
consequently, the judiciary should proceed with care before mandating that an employer must
adopt a plaintiff's alternate selection or hiring practice in response to a Title VII suit." Id.
(citation omitted).
135. See id.
136. Id. at 2125-26.
137. "Whether or not [plaintiff's] weak showing was sufficient to establish a prima facie
case, it clearly failed to carry [plaintiff's] ultimate burden of proving a violation of Title VII."
New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979).
138. See supra note 39.
139. See 29 C.F.R § 1607.3 (1988).
140. Cf. SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT Dis-
CRIMINATION § 1.5 (1980) (perceptively recognizing that this language placed a burden of persua-
sion on the plaintiff, but arguing that placing such a burden on plaintiff was wrong).
141. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446-47 (1982) ("the employer must then demon-
strate that 'any given requirement has a manifest relationship to the employment in question,' in
order to avoid a finding of discrimination") (emphasis added); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
321, 329 (1977) and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (both quoting
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)) ("Congress has placed on the employer the
burden of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employ-
ment in question") (emphasis added).
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clear and repeated underlying assumption of the Court. 14 2
The plurality in Watson stated otherwise-that the plaintiff retained
the ultimate burden of persuasion-though using an analysis that was
patently ambiguous. 43 Nonetheless, any lingering ambiguity as to the
allocation of burdens was resolved by Wards Cove Packing:
142. E.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (emphasizing
that the burden on defendant in a disparate treatment case was one of "going forward" with the
evidence, and assuming that this burden differed dramatically from the employer's burden when
plaintiff proved adverse impact); accord Board of Trustees, Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439
U.S. 24 (1978) (reversing lower courts because they imposed a burden of persuasion in a dispa-
rate treatment case); see also Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978) (identifying
the case before it as involving disparate treatment with the employer's burden being to articulate
a legitimate reason for the disparate treatment, and recognizing that had the plaintiff proved
adverse impact the burden would have been different); International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
In County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 168-69 (1981), the Court construed the
Bennett Amendment proviso of 703(h) of Title VII to do no more than incorporate by reference
the "factors other than sex defense" of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 et. seq., into Title
VII. In response to the argument that this rendered the proviso superfluous, the Court indicated
that normally an employer's burden in a Title VII impact case would require more than proving.
a "factor other than sex." Gunther, 452 U.S. at 170. The Equal Pay Act unambiguously places
a burden of persuasion on employers to prove the existence of the "factor other than sex."
Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196-97 (1974). Thus, if the Title VII impact
burden requires more from an employer than the Equal Pay Act, then "business necessity" must
be a heavier burden than "factor other than sex," which is a burden of persuasion.
Even Justice White (author of Wards Cove Packing) assumed that "business necessity" was a
burden of persuasion. Dissenting in Beazer he stated:
petitioners [the employer] had the burden of showing job relatedness ...
[Pletitioners have not come close to showing that the present rule is "demonstrably a
reasonable measure of job performance." No one could reasonably argue that peti-
tioners have made the kind of showing demanded by Griggs or Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody. By petitioners' own stipulation, this employment barrier was adopted
"without meaningful study of its relationship to job-performance ability."
Beazer, 440 U.S. at 602 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
143. The Court in Watson stated:
Although we have said that an employer has "the burden of showing that any given
requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question," such a
formulation should not be interpreted as implying that the ultimate burden of proof
can be shifted to the defendant. On the contrary, the ultimate burden of proving that
discrimination against a protected group has been caused by a specific employment
practice remains with the plaintiff at all times.
Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2790 (citations omitted).
That seems clear enough. If the defendant produces evidence of a "manifest relationship," the
defendant will prevail unless the plaintiff can convince the fact finder that the relationship does
not in fact exist. But the opinion did not say this. Immediately following the above statement,
the plurality continued:
Thus, when a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of disparate impact, and when
the defendant has met its burden of producing evidence that its employment practices
are based on legitimate business reasons, the plaintiff must "show that other tests or
selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve the
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In this phase [of responding to proof of adverse impact] the
employer carries the burden of producing evidence of a business
justification for his employment practice. The burden of persuasion,
however, remains with the disparate-impact plaintiff. To the extent
that the Ninth Circuit held otherwise ... suggesting that the
persuasion burden should shift to [defendant] once the [plaintiffs]
established a prima facie case of disparate impact-its decisions were
erroneous. . . . [T]o the extent that those [prior Supreme Court]
cases speak of an employer's "burden of proof" with respect to a
legitimate business justification defense, they should have been
understood to mean an employer's production-but not
persuasion-burden. l4
Thus, a defendant has the burden of presenting evidence that the
challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the employment goals
of the defendant. The evidence must be sufficient to permit the fact
finder to infer that such a relationship exists. If the defendant fails to
produce sufficient evidence to allow a fact finder to conclude that the
challenged practice in fact serves, in a significant way, defined em-
ployment goals, the plaintiff is entitled to prevail. On the other hand,
if the defendant satisfies the burden of production, Wards Cove Pack-
ing directs that the plaintiff bears the ultimate risk of persuasion on
the nonjustification for the challenged practice.' 41
In sum, "necessity" no longer means, as the dictionary tells us,
"essential," "absolutely required," or "indispensable";4 it means
employer's legitimate interest
Id. (citation omitted).
It seems as if Justice O'Connor left out a step. If the defendant merely produces some evi-
dence of a "manifest relationship," will the plaintiff lose unless he can prove a lesser discrimina-
tory alternative? That cannot be, because that accepts defendant's presentation as being
established, and deprives the plaintiff of any opportunity, even if the plaintiff has a burden of
persuasion, to prove that the proffered evidence of a "manifest relationship" is faulty and not
to be believed. Consequently, with such a patent error in analysis, the entire discussion must be
discounted.
144. Wards Cove Packing, 109 S. Ct. at 2126 (citation omitted). It is interesting, too, that
while insisting that "business necessity" does not mean "essential" or "necessary," Justice
White continues to use the term "necessary."
Moreover, the repeated use of the word "defense" in the opinion suggests that the Court
recognizes, regardless of what it now says, that the burden traditionally has been imposed on the
defendant. The burden of presenting a defense is uniformly placed upon the defendant. Thus, by
use of the word "defense," the Court in essence conceeds that we have not misread the previous
cases to read that the burden of establishing business necessity was always upon the defendant.
145. See C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 947-48 (3d
ed. 1984); 9 J. WIOMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW § 2485 (. Chadbourn rev. 1981); LILLY, EVIDENCE §§ 47-48 (2d ed. 1987).
146. See supra notes 68 and 111.
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only "legitimate" and "significant.' ' 147 And for eighteen years "busi-
ness necessity" was a "defense" to be proved by the employer. Every-
one, including Justice White, knew it was a defense' 48 . But now the
Court says it is not and never was. 149 So, the "business necessity" de-
fense is now the "legitimate justification production burden." 5 0 Wel-
come to "Wonderland.'' s
Justice White tells us that we had merely misread what the Court
had previously said. But the Court must know that the courts, the
enforcement agencies, the scholars and commentators have not mis-
read anything. We all know that the Court has changed the law.
That's all right; for good cause the Court can and should reverse it-
self, but should do so honestly. The Court has changed the law,
changed it rather significantly, and the Court should know that we
know that it has changed the law. Like Woodrow Wilson's nation
"too proud to fight,'9 2 the Court, however, was simply too proud to
confess that it had switched. Better to tell us that we cannot read.5 3
147. Yet the dictionary tells us that "legitimate" means "reasonable." Id.
148. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 602 (1979) (White, J., dis-
senting). It is interesting how Justice White, even in Wards Cove Packing, refers to the "legiti-
mate business justification defense." Wards Cove Packing, 109 S. Ct. at 2126 (emphasis added).
He does it twice, once in the above quotation, and again later on the same page where he com-
ments on the "petitioner's business necessity defense." Id. (emphasis added). Generally, a de-
fense authorizes conduct otherwise illegal, and, as any first-year law student knows, the burden
of establishing a defense is on the defendant. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161
(1981). A mere evidentiary obligation of coming forward with evidence is not a "defense." Per-
haps this slip of the pen discloses the truth.
149. See G. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 181-82 (1949); Steelworkers v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193, 219 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
150. Judge Posner proposes that in the wake of Wards Cove Packing the "business neces-
sity" defense should be renamed the "issue of legitimate employer purpose." Allen v. Seidman,
881 F.2d 375, 381 (7th Cir. 1989).
151. Alice conversed with Humpty Dumpty:
"I don't know what you mean by 'glory,"' Alice said.
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. "Of course you don't-till I tell you. I
meant 'there's a nice knock-down argument for you!"'
"But 'glory' doesn't mean 'a nice knock-down argument,"' Alice objected.
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it means
just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many differ-
ent things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master-that's all."
L. CARROLL, ALICE's ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND, (Through the Looking Glass) 246-47 (Mod-
ern Library ed.).
Clearly, the Court, not the word, is the master.
152. Address by Woodrow Wilson to Foreign-Born Citizens (May 10, 1915).
153. Relieving the employer of the burden of justifying the use of a device having exclusion-
ary effect produces an anomaly in employment discrimination law, an anomaly the Court appar-
ently did not recognize. It places on employers in Title VII cases a lighter burden than imposed
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IV. THE EMPLOYER'S EVIDENTIARY BURDEN AFTER
WARDS COVE PACKING
Upon proof that a device adversely affects employment opportuni-
ties, the evidentiary burden imposed by Wards Cove Packing on a de-
fendant is one of producing evidence that the challenged practice
"serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the
employer.' ' 4 While this appears to be a broad restatement of the
well-established "manifest relationship" standard, the issue remains
as to precisely how much evidence the defendant must produce.
Clearly, the defendant's burden must be more than simply restating
the particular factor being challenged. Requiring only this would be
no burden at all. To illustrate, if a plaintiff proves that a high school
diploma has an adverse impact on blacks, a defendant's burden must
be more than simply to restate the obvious-that the reason the plain-
tiff was rejected was because he lacked a high school diploma.
Consequently, the defendant's burden must include some proof that
the device serves identified legitimate and substantial business goals.
That is, the defendant's burden would be to identify the particular
employment goal and to present evidence of how the required educa-
tional credentials "serve in a significant way" the identified goal.
Merely being abstractly rational, as opposed to arbitrary, would not
suffice. The defendant, therefore, has some burden of presenting ob-
under the Equal Pay Act. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982). Under the Equal Pay Act, if a plaintiff
proves equal work between male and female employees for unequal pay, the employer can avoid
liability only by proving that the difference was attributable to a "factor other than sex." Id. §
206(d)(1)(iv). This requires the employer to carry the burden of establishing the gender neutrality
and "business rationality" of the factor used to make the pay distinction. County of Washing-
ton v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981); Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974);
Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982). Consequently, if an employer justified
a pay difference between a male and a female by asserting that the difference was because the
higher paid employee had a diploma, the employer would carry the burden of proving not only
good faith in use of the diploma, but also that the diploma had a relationship to valid employer
concerns. EEOC v. First Citizens Bank of Billings, 758 F.2d 397 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 902 (1985); Strecker v. Grand Forks County Social Serv. Bd., 640 F.2d 96, 100 (8th Cir.
1980), overruled on other grounds, Robino v. Norton, 682 F.2d 192 (8th Cir. 1982). However,
assume the employer uses the same device, a diploma, to justify a pay difference between a black
employee and a white employee. Since the Equal Pay Act is applicable only to sex discrimina-
tion, Title VII is the only source of protection for the black employee. Assuming that a pay
premium for eduction adversely affects minorities, Liberles v. Cook County, 709 F.2d 1122 (7th
Cir. 1983), the burden on the employer after Wards Cove Packing is simply to produce evidence
of a relationship between salary and education, with the ultimate burden of proving the absence
of any relationship on the plaintiff. The Equal Pay Act places this burden on the defendant;
Wards Cove Packing places this burden on the Title VII plaintiff. This is ironic because Title VII
is suppose to go further and provide more sweeping protections than the Equal Pay Act. See
Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
154. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2125-26 (1989).
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jective evidence, perhaps even statistical evidence, of validation, fac-
tually showing a nexus between the selection device and a particular
employment goal.'55 Without evidence of such a relationship, it can-
not be said that the defendant has presented any evidence that the
"challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate em-
ployment goals of the employer." 56 Thus, if an educational credential
or an objective test were shown to have an adverse impact, and the
burden of production is to have any meaning, the defendant would
have to prove, through some objective evidence, that education or test
scores in fact measured employee competence or potential.
Factual proof of a relationship between the challenged device and
job performance that was "manifest" was precisely what was required
of the defendants in Griggs, Albemarle Paper, and Dothard. The
plaintiffs in each of these cases prevailed, even though the defendants
presented rational or legitimate justifications for use of the challenged
devices. However, the defendants presented insufficient evidence of a
factual connection between their purpose and the device to permit a
fact finder to conclude that such a nexus existed.
It is extremely important, even controlling, that Wards Cove Pack-
ing did not reverse Griggs, Albemarle Paper, and Dothard. Wards
Cove Packing simply reinterpreted these cases. It had always been as-
sumed that the defendants lost in Griggs, Albemarle Paper, and Do-
thard because in each case the defendant failed to carry a burden of
establishing "business necessity," a burden that was assumed to be a
burden of persuasion. However, we now know, because Wards Cove
Packing so instructs us, that the defendants lost in each of these cases
because they did not meet the required burden of producing sufficient
evidence from which a fact finder could have concluded that the nec-
essary "manifest relationship" existed. The employer's longstanding
and substantial burden of producing a strong factual showing of a
manifest relationship was not overruled in Wards Cove Packing; in-
deed it was confirmed.
155. Of course, where statistical validation is not practical, such as where the employer uses
subjective devices, or where a high degree of risk flows from unsatisfactory performance, statis-
tical validation is not now required. See Davis v. Dallas, 777 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1985) (subjective
judgment and discretion permitted in selecting police officers), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1116
(1986); Merwine v. Board of Trustees, 754 F.2d 631 (5th Cir.) (impractical to validate masters
degree requirement for professional librarians), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 823 (1985); Zahorik v.
Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 96 (2d Cir. 1984) (tenure decisions at university involved subjective
judgment and discretion by university officials); Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 697 F.2d 810
(8th Cir. 1983) (educational requirements for mid-level supervisors a "business necessity");
Spurlock v. United Airlines, 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972) (minimum level of skill requirement
for airline pilots justified due to the high level of risk involved).
156. Wards Cove Packing, 109 S. Ct. at 2125-26.
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Thus, in Griggs the plaintiff won because the defendant, while indi-
cating that it desired a better-educated work force, presented no fac-
tual basis from which a fact finder might conclude that a high school
diploma in any way predicted the performance of lower level, semi-
skilled workers.'57 In Albemarle Paper the plaintiff prevailed even
though the defendant presented evidence, including conclusions of an
expert witness, that the pen-and-paper test predicted job performance.
The plaintiff was entitled to prevail because the defendant had not
presented sufficiently strong evidence, including professional valida-
tion, to permit a fact finder to conclude that the test actually pre-
dicted employee job performance with mathematical accuracy.' 58 The
Dothard plaintiffs prevailed in spite of the general rationality of mini-
mum height and weight requirements for prison guards. The defen-
dants identified strength as the job-related quality that the
requirement was designed to serve. However, once again the plaintiffs
prevailed because the "[defendant] produced no evidence correlating
the height and weight requirements with the requisite amount of
strength thought essential to good job performance."15 9
Wards Cove Packing cited each of these cases with approval. 160 The
result in each was thus confirmed. They are still valid for the points
which they resolved. Presumably, the same results would be reached
even after Wards Cove Packing. Defendant'_s evidentiary obligation is
to present strong evidence manifesting a precise correlation between'
ihe device and job performance. Failure to present such evidence, as-
outlined in Griggs, Albemarle Paper, and Dothard, should result in a
judgment for the plaintiff as a matter of law.
This result is as it must be. It is the employer that controls the work
force. Consequently, only the employer has the ability to evaluate job
performance, a key element in any scientific validation of selection
devices. 16' Thus, if anyone is to be required to present evidence of a
correlation between selection devices and job performance, it must be
the defendant. The plaintiff simply does not have access to the data
necessary to make such a showing. Having access to such data, the
defendant should have an obligation to present the "best evidence"
available of a device's correlation to job performance. It is the em-
ployer that selected the device, and since the device has been proved
by the plaintiff to be exclusionary, the employer must carry a signifi-
157. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
158. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
159. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977).
160. Wards Cove Packing, 109 S. Ct. at 2118-19, 2125, 2126.
161. See Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 440-41 (Marshall, J., concurring); 29 C.F.R. §
1607.14B(2) (1988).
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cant burden of presenting fundamental, as opposed to conclusive, jus-
tifications.
In most cases where defendants present generalized or conclusive
evidence of the relationship between the device and employer goals,
the result reached now will be the same as it was prior to Wards Cove
Packing. Now, as before, the defendant's burden is to present precise
proof of the need for exclusionary devices. Failure to present such
proof, as in Griggs, Albemarle Paper, and Dothard, will result in a
judgment for the plaintiff. A different result can be expected, how-
ever, in close cases where the defendant presents data that would al-
low a fact finder to conclude that a correlation between the device and
the job exists, and the plaintiff counters with probative data that in-
cludes possible flaws and potential unreliability in the defendant's
showing. In the pre- Wards Cove Packing days, when the defendant
was said to carry the burden of persuading the fact finder, uncertainty
resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff. The judge would be expected
to reason: "I do not know whose statistics are right. Defendant car-
ries the burden of persuading me. He did not. Plaintiff wins." Today,
after Wards Cove Packing, with the plaintiff carrying the burden of
proving the lack of any relationship tentatively established by defend-
ant's proof, uncertainty should result in a judgment for the defend-
ant. Thus, in a battle of the experts where the trial judge is faced with
unfathomable, complex and conflicting validation models, each with
its potential flaws, a victory flowing from uncertainty that would have
gone to the plaintiff prior to Wards Cove Packing can now be ex-
pected to go to the defendant. In such cases the court might be ex-
pected to reason as follows: "Defendant's validation data standing
alone could be accepted. Plaintiff's challenge raises some serious
doubts as to the probative value of defendant's data. But since I don't
know whose statistics are more accurate, and since plaintiff carries the
burden of persuading me, and he didn't, defendant wins."
V. A PROPOSED Two-TIER IMPACT ANALYSIS
WITH MOTIVE AS A CENTRAL ELEMENT
Two competing considerations exist in selecting the most appropri-
ate standard for analyzing the impact of neutral selection devices. The
first is the Title VII goal of seeking to ensure equal employment op-
portunities for women and minorities, a goal clearly articulated in
Griggs.162 The second goal is protecting employers' ability to secure
capable and efficient employees to the extent compatible with Title
162. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
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VII equal employment goals. Striking down all employment barriers
may well broaden employment opportunities, but will also impose
upon employers unqualified and inefficient employees. Conversely, al-
lowing employers to utilize any selection system, so long as the em-
ployer cannot be proved to have been acting in bad faith, will doom
equal employment opportunity for vast numbers of minorities.
The best legal standard will be the one that most completely accom-
modates those competing ends, providing maximum job access to
women and minorities consistent with securing the justifiable needs of
employers to select the most qualified employees. In a utilitarian
sense, to the extent the analysis used to evaluate the legality of impact
serves one goal with little or no sacrifice to the competing goal, the
analysis is valid. On the other hand, if the analysis serves one goal
only marginally while subverting the alternative goal, the analysis is
flawed. An analysis can tolerate a balance where the increased service
of one end is counterbalanced by an equal sacrifice of the competing
goal. In such a situation the issue of which goal to sacrifice is a policy
question. However, when the application of a legal analysis results in
a sacrifice of one goal without securing at least an equal counterbal-
ancing service to the conflicting goal, the analysis is flawed.
In this regard, the Griggs approach to impact analysis has been
proved by Wards Cove Packing to be flawed. The Griggs approach to
impact, without regard to motive, is a single-tier analysis that can re-
sult in an unnecessary sacrifice of policy goals when applied to various
factual patterns, without a counterbalancing service of the competing
goal. This has produced judicial confusion and vacillation in a vain
attempt to apply this analytical model in a way that reaches a balance
deemed appropriate by the particular court.
The Griggs- Wards Cove Packing approach to impact requires first
that plaintiff establish a threshold level of impact. If that threshold is
established, at whatever level the Court directs as adequate to meet
the legal standard of having an "adverse impact" on the class, the
burden shifts to the defendant to establish the "business necessity" of
the challenged rule. Once impact is proved, regardless of the intensity
or level of the impact on employment opportunities, the employer can
avoid liability by showing the "business necessity" at whatever level
the Court defined for the concept of "necessity."
When "business necessity" was construed to mean something akin
to "essential," as in the days of Griggs, Albemarle Paper, and Doth-
ard, the evidentiary obligation imposed on employers was quite heavy
in every case, regardless of the impact on women or minorities. How-
ever, if "business necessity" is defined to mean merely "legitimate,"
as suggested in Watson, the employer's burden would be very light
1989]
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and remain very light, regardless of the impact of the selection device.
Now, as "business necessity" is defined in Wards Cove Packing to
mean "business purpose," the employer's burden, again regardless of
the degree of impact, is merely to present evidence that would support
a business purpose, a burden somewhere between the two extremes of
"essential" and "legitimate." The key point is this: regardless of the
intensity of the impact, once sufficient effect is established to meet a
threshold definition of "impact," the burden of convincing the fact
finder of "business necessity" (whatever the term means) is constant.
Such a rigid approach poorly serves the employer's goal of effi-
ciency by requiring employers to justify devices having a relatively
slight effect on minority hiring with the same level of evidence as is
required to justify devices which have a devastating effect on minori-
ties. Utilitarian logic would suggest that if the effect of a device on
minorities is less, the employer should have less of a burden to justify
the use of the device. Otherwise, employer efficiency is being sacri-
ficed without a corresponding increase in the protection of equal em-
ployment opportunity. Conversely, allowing an employer to justify a
devastatingly exclusionary device according to the same standards as
are applied to a device having a relatively slight impact on minority
opportunities can result in undermining the goal of equal employment
without a counterbalancing improvement in employer efficiency.
Perhaps because threshold standards are central to the Griggs sin-
gle-tier analysis, there has been confusion and vacillation in the judi-
cial search for the proper level of these standards. Because Griggs'
version of impact analysis required that once impact was proved, the
employer must provide some justification for use of the device regard-
less of the degree of impact-slight or exclusionary-or suffer an ad-
verse judgment, those emphasizing employment opportunity have
argued for a relatively slight threshold level of adverse impact. Griggs,
and to some degree Dothard, illustrate acceptance of such thinking.
Of course, the employer would have to meet the same high standard
of justification as would be imposed on devices having a devastating
effect. This could result in sacrificing an employer's ability to select
qualified employees by striking down selection devices that have some
viability in measuring potential with relatively little return in terms of
truly increasing employment opportunities for qualified minorities.
Conversely, those sympathetic to employers' interests in efficiency
have argued for a high level of required impact, imposing on the em-
ployer a burden of justification only if the evidence clearly established
that a protected class was virtually excluded from employment by the
device. Beazer and Wards Cove Packing represent a shift to an em-
ployer-sensitive, high threshold of impact. One consequence of requir-
[Vol. 17:1
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ing a high level of impact is that devices which may have a significant,
but less than devastating, impact on minority employment opportuni-
ties can be used by the employer without any evidence that the device
is useful in selecting an efficient work force. Equal employment op-
portunity is sacrificed without a counterbalancing benefit to employer
efficiency.
This problem of unitary analysis becomes focused when the issue is
the degree of justification required once a device is found to have a
legally sufficient effect to shift the burden of justifying use of the de-
vice to the employer. If legally sufficient impact is based on a rela-
tively slight effect on employment opportunities, a high standard of
business justification might deprive an employer of a useful selection
device without a utilitarian balance in terms of significantly increasing
employment opportunities for minorities. Griggs, Albemarle Paper
and Dothard illustrate this possibility. Once the Court concluded that
impact had been proved, the Court, without regard to the level of that
impact, imposed on the employer a uniformly high standard for justi-
fying the challenged device.
Beazer and Watson, on the other hand, represented a shift in think-
ing that is less sympathetic to the Title VII goal of securing employ-
ment opportunity in the face of exclusionary devices, and much more
attuned to employer demands for autonomy and efficiency. These
cases indicated that regardless of the level of impact, the justification
required of an employer would be at a very low level: merely articulat-
ing a rational basis for use of the exclusionary device. The price to
pay for such ease of justification is that devices with only marginal
utility for selecting competent employees could be used, despite the
fact that the device would deprive huge segments of the population
access to employment. Such marginal increases in efficiency cannot be
justified in terms of equal employment opportunity costs.
Wards Cove Packing settled on what might be considered a mid-tier
burden of employer justification-less than absolute necessity, but
considerably greater than mere rationality-and moved the ultimate
burden of persuasion on the issue of justification to the plaintiff. Per-
haps this can be considered an appropriate balance of the competing
interests-a compromise-but because the Wards Cove Packing ap-
proach clings to the single-tier analysis of Griggs, the approach still
lacks the flexibility to fully balance the competing interests.
The point is that all of these cases, Griggs through Wards Cove
Packing, applied a single standard of employer justification for use of
a device regardless of the level or degree of impact the device had on a
protected class. Moreover, the Court never suggested that the place-
ment of the burden of persuasion was dependent upon the degree of
1989]
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impact the device had on employment of women and minorities in
that particular case. 63 Regardless of where the standard of impact is
placed, and regardless of the level of justification, when a single stan-
dard is used the result in some cases is an unnecessary sacrifice of one
or the other of these valid, but competing, interests.
Moreover, a unitary analytical standard has produced, and no
doubt will continue to produce, judicial vacillation in the search for
the single most appropriate standard. In the days of Griggs, Dothard,
and Albemarle Paper, the obvious socio-economic proclivities of a
majority of the Court were to finding impact upon relatively thin evi-
dence of effect, and, once impact was found, to imposing on the em-
ployer a uniformly heavy burden to justify use of such a device.
Watson and Wards Cove Packing illustrate that with the change of
personnel, and perhaps philosophy, in the eyes of five Justices the bal-
ance had tilted too far in favor of civil rights plaintiffs. As a result,
Wards Cove Packing confirmed the need for greater proof of effect to
trigger an employer's obligation to justify its selection system. The
Court also relaxed an employer's burden of justification, once the
necessary level of impact is established, by shifting to plaintiff the ul-
timate burden of persuasion on the issue of "necessity." One would
suspect Wards Cove Packing is not the final word, but rather is
merely indicative of the current ideological predilections of five mem-
bers of the Court. As the personnel of the Court changes with time,
one would expect that the standards of proof will continue to shift to
reflect the particular socio-economic philosophy of the justices. The
next generation of justices might well conclude that the Title VII pur-
poses of promoting employment opportunity are not served by the
Wards Cove Packing protection of employer interests, and, with no
163. In New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979), the Court seemed
to be flirting with the idea of adopting a flexible standard under the pure impact analysis created
by Griggs, the weight of the employer's burden depending upon the degree of the impact of the
challenged device. The weaker the proof of impact, the weaker would be the employer's burden
to justify the use of the device. When the proof of impact was weak, as it was in Beazer, the
employer's burden was satisfied by a simple showing that employer's goals were "significantly
served." If the plaintiff proved that the effect of using the device was destructive of employment
opportunities of a protected class, as the plaintiffs appeared to do in Griggs, the employer would
have to prove full strength "necessity" for using the device. A device that eliminated significant
numbers, but was far from exclusionary, as was the height and weight requirement in Dothard,
would beget a mid-tier burden on the employer to prove that the requirement was "manifestly
related" to precise elements of the job. See M. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMINATION LAW §
5.41 (1988).
Wards Cove Packing put such speculation to rest. The Court did not move toward a flexible
or multi-tiered analysis that varied the employer's burden with the degree of impact, but instead
rigidly reasserted its commitment to a single-tier analysis, with a uniform employer burden of
production. Wards Cove Packing, 109 S. Ct. at 2115.
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more hesitation than demonstrated by Justice White, switch defini-
tions to make proof of liability more favorable to plaintiffs.
Wards Cove Packing, with its dramatic shift away from Griggs, has
finally brought into focus the need to reexamine the analytical prem-
ises of Griggs. Perhaps the underlying instincts of Justice O'Connor
were sound when she spoke for the plurality in Watson, that Title VII
indeed does speak in terms of motive, and that impact can serve as a
proxy for motive.'6 Nonetheless, if Justice O'Connor's analysis had
been accepted by the Court, and traditional motivational analysis
were applied to all impact cases without regard to the level of exclu-
sion, devastating consequences to the realization of equal opportunity
goals would have resulted. The current featherweight burden on em-
ployers to counter inferences of illegal motive drawn from objective
factors would result in all but the most outrageously unreliable selec-
tion devices remaining unchallenged. Thus, the conclusion that impact
should do no more than trigger traditional motive analysis is too ex-
treme in its failure to protect women and minorities from the conse-
quences of mindless selection devices.
Perhaps also the instinct of Justice White, writing for the majority
in Wards Cove Packing, was not too wrong, that in cases where the
effect of the employer's systems on minority hiring is relatively slight,
absent evidence of invidious motive, the employer should only have to
present evidence of a significant business purpose to avoid liability. A
burden of proving an absolute form of necessity in such cases may be
unduly intrusive into the good faith efforts of an employer to select
qualified employees. However, this, too, fails to allow for cases where
the device, as in Griggs, effectively denies employment to a substantial
segment of a racial minority. To guarantee that the overriding statu-
tory goal of ensuring equal employment opportunity is met, a goal
emphasized in Griggs, the statute should go beyond allowing the em-
ployer to use exclusionary devices by simply presenting some evidence
of a business reason for use of such a device.
As applied to its facts, which appeared to demonstrate the relatively
uncertain impact of the employer's practice on employment opportu-
nities, Wards Cove Packing may not be too wrong in granting rela-
tively relaxed protection of equal employment opportunities.
However, if the Wards Cove Packing analysis is applied to devices
which have an exclusionary effect, the employer's burden is simply
too light to be consistent with the equal employment opportunity
goals expressed in Title VII and heralded in Griggs.
164. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2784-86 (1989).
19891
HeinOnline  -- 17 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 41 1989-1990
42 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
An answer for the future lies in the past, in the compromise found
in the labor relations cases. Contrary to the holding in Griggs, the
courts should recognize, as would Justice O'Connor, that the clear
wording and history of Title VII suggest, at least as strongly as does
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 165 that motive is an ele-
ment of Title VII liability. However, plaintiff's proof of the adverse
impact of a selection system on a class protected by Title VII, similar
to analysis under the NLRA, creates a presumption that use of the
device was improperly motivated. Faced with this presumption of ille-
gal motive, the defendant will have the burden of presenting objective
business justifications for the use of the exclusionary device. These
business justifications for the use of the device must be sufficiently
weighty to create an inference of legal, or business, motive sufficiently
strong to counter the plaintiff's presumption of improper motive. The
weight of the defendant's burden will depend upon the degree of im-
pact of the selection device upon the employment opportunities of a
class protected by Title VII. The greater the impact, the more the pre-
sumption of improper motive strengthens. The stronger the presump-
tion of improper motive, the heavier the employer's burden to refute
the presumption becomes.
In this regard, if the impact of the selection device is proved to be
only "relatively slight," the employer's burden would be the relatively
light obligation to present evidence that the device serves significant
business interests. This is a burden of presenting evidence of the em-
ployer's business concern and evidence that the device serves this con-
cern in a significant way. However, if the impact of the device on a
protected class is so great as to be destructive of Title VII's goal of
equal employment opportunity-that is, the device falls very heavily
on women and minorities-the presumption that the employer in-
tended this result is so strong that it can be refuted only by the strong-
est possible proof of "business necessity." In such cases of
devastating or destructive impact, the burden on the employer would
be to prove the true "necessity" for the use of such a device. The
employer's burden to justify a device with an exclusionary effect
would be one of proving true necessity: that the device is essential to
secure weighty employer goals to the point that the employer could
not safely and effectively operate its business without utilizing the de-
vice.
Thus, the first step in this analysis is for the plaintiff to prove not
only impact, but the degree of the impact on employment opportuni-
165. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
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ties of women or minorities. The burden assigned to the employer to
refute the inference flowing from this impact is based upon the degree
of impact. This standard would go beyond Griggs in its analysis and
beyond Wards Cove Packing in its holding, and adopt a system quite
similar to that used by cases under the NLRA. 66 Further, this analysis
would allow both Griggs and Wards Cove Packing to be affirmed by
the Court. Griggs, as construed by Albemarle Paper and Dothard,
would establish the employer's burden when the challenged device has
a heavy or destructive impact on employment opportunities. Wards
Cove Packing would establish the employer's burden in cases where
the effect of a system on employment opportunities was relatively
light.
Such a two-tier analysis based on a presumption of motive would
eliminate the need for the seemingly unending judicial search for a
single appropriate standard. The uncertainty and constant fluctuation
experienced under the Griggs- Wards Cove Packing approach could be
reduced. With more flexibility built into the analysis, there would be
little need to constantly adjust and readjust the standards of proof
based on shifting ideological beliefs. For example, "moderate" jus-
tices such as Justices White and O'Connor, when faced with the uni-
tary analysis provided in Griggs, concluded in Wards Cove Packing
that the pendulum had swung too far in favor of plaintiffs. Accord-
ingly, they upwardly adjusted the level of proof to establish impact,
and downwardly adjusted the employer's burden once that impact was
proved. They might have accepted an analysis that required employers
to carry a heavy burden of justification for use of devices that virtu-
ally excluded women and minority applicants if, in return, that heavy
burden did not apply where the impact of a challenged device was
comparatively slight. On the other hand, "liberal" justices such as
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun might be content with a
standard of analysis that imposed on employers a relatively light bur-
den of presenting a legitimate business reason for use of devices that
had only a slight effect on opportunities of women and minorities if a
higher level of justification were required of employers who used se-
lection devices that had a heavy exclusionary effect on minority appli-
cants.
To summarize, under this proposed standard the Court would ac-
cept the premise that motive is a necessary element of Title VII liabil-
ity, but that presumptions of illegal motive are created by proof that a
device adversely affects employment opportunities of classes protected
166. See supra notes 19, 23-31 and accompanying text.
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by Title VII. If the impact on employment opportunities were rela-
tively slight, the employer would have some burden of justifying the
device. It would not escape from any justification simply because of
the slight impact. However, since the slight impact created only a
weak presumption of improper motive, the employer's burden would
be correspondingly light-to present evidence that would permit a fact
finder to conclude that the device serves significant business purposes.
In this way, employers could utilize reasonable selection systems that
have a relatively light impact on employment opportunities by simply
showing business rationality. At the same time, it would not permit
employers to utilize useless or arbitrary devices simply because the im-
pact on women and minorities was relatively light.
When the impact of a device results in virtual exclusion of a pro-
tected class, the presumption that the employer must have foreseen
and intended this result is particularly strong. Accordingly, use of
such a system would be presumed to have been improperly motivated
unless the employer could carry the heavy burden of proving the true
necessity for using such a system. Employers would be allowed to use
devices with heavy impact if the device proved necessary. However,
employers would be precluded from using marginally useful selection
devices where the price in terms of denying equal employment oppor-
tunity is greater than the usefulness of the selection device. Thus, the
greater the impact, the greater the employer's burden. Such an analy-
sis balances the needs of the employer to select an effective work force
against the Title VII goals of increasing and ensuring equal employ-
ment opportunity. It does not sacrifice one goal without a counterbal-
ancing service of a competing goal. This proposed two-tier impact
analysis recognizes the need for flexibility; the Griggs-Wards Cove
Packing single standard does not. 167
167. Wards Cove Packing may also reduce the pressure for affirmative action and cause a
reevaluation of United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). That is, the rearticulation of
impact analysis in Wards Cove Packing may foretell some shift in affirmative action law and
practice.
The underlying premise for permitting employers to consider race or gender to remedy under-
representation was articulated in Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Weber. Id. at 209 (Black-
mun, J., concurring). Potential liability on slim proof of impact, coupled with onerous burdens
of employer justification, made it preferable, if not necessary, for employers to remedy racial
imbalances by using racial considerations in hiring. From a liability perspective, this placed the
employer on a "tightrope without a net." Id. at 209-211 (Blackmun, J., concurring). If the
employer took no action to avoid the consequences of an imbalanced work force, the employer
faced almost certain liability in a suit by underrepresented minorities. If the employer avoided
impact by using racially conscious hiring systems, overriding traditional selection systems, the
employer was subject to a complaint by the white male majority that it was utilizing "race" in
selecting employees, an express and facial violation of Title VII. Thus, the conundrum needed
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VI. CONCLUSION
To state that Wards Cove Packing is significant would be a classic
understatement. It is important, not only for what it did, but also for
what it did not do, in that the decision has a great capacity for being
misconstrued by the lower courts. On the positive side, Wards Cove
Packing could be a stimulus to rethink the entire impact analysis con-
cept pioneered by Griggs, and to adopt the flexible NLRA approach
of presuming improper motive based on the degree of impact of the
selection device.
Wards Cove Packing analyzed in detail the nature of the plaintiff's
obligation to prove impact. Aside from confirming that precise proof
of a high level of impact is necessary to create a prima facie showing,
the Court made no startling revelations in this regard. The Court also
clarified the ambiguity of the substantive nature of an employer's bur-
resolution. Either liability should not be premised on a combination of impact drawn from num-
bers and a heavy burden of justification, or the employer should be permitted to make express
racial decisions to remedy the numbers that create liability. So long as liability is premised on
numerical proof of impact, the employer must be permitted by the statute which creates this
vulnerability to avoid liability by taking racially-conscious remedial action.
In Weber it was assumed that impact analysis was inviolate, so the Court selected the only
alternative. The Court allowed employers to utilize reasonable racially-conscious hiring practices
to remedy "conspicuous racial imbalance" in "traditionally segregated job categories." Id. at
208-09.
Weber combined with Griggs resulted in a two-prong aid for the plight of minority employ-
ment; ease of proving liability, which, in turn, encouraged affirmative action hiring, the legality
of which Weber confirmed. Herein lies the danger of Wards Cove Packing-it has undermined a
key premise upon which affirmative action is based. When Wards Cove Packing made it more
difficult for plaintiffs to prove impact and relaxed the burden on employers to justify any impact
proved, this reduced the pressure on employers to adopt affirmative action plans as a basis for
avoiding liability premised on impact. As the practical need to engage in affirmative action is
tied to the ease in which Title VII liability can be proved, when the Court makes it more difficult
to prove liability, the pressure on employers to initiate affirmative action as a defensive measure
is similarly reduced.
Moreover, reducing the practical need for employers to engage in racially conscious hiring to
remedy imbalances could cause the Court to revisit the legality of racially conscious programs
sanctioned in Weber. Again, it was the practical problem of the employer's dilemma-faced on
one hand with liability if it did not remedy underrepresentation, and liability to white males if it
attempted a remedy through affirmative action-that served as the justification for Weber to
torture the statutory language and reach the eminently practical result that allowed "affirmative
action" hiring to remedy conspicuous imbalances. To the extent that Wards Cove Packing re-
duces the threat of liability premised on numbers, the Court may well apply the plain language
of the statute which prohibits all racial discrimination and prohibit affirmative action hiring
plans. Indeed, Watson recognized this reality, and specifically cited the need for employers to
avoid draconian affirmative action steps as a justification for their proposed dilution of liability
premised on impact. See Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2787-88.
Wards Cove Packing may thus indirectly begin a process that results first in retrenchment of
affirmative action voluntarily undertaken by employers. Thereafter, since the employer vulnera-
bility premise which underpinned Weber's sanction of race conscious affirmative action has been
eroded by Wards Cove Packing, the ultimate result may be a reevaluation of Weber itself.
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den once a plaintiff proved that a device adversely affected a class.
This ambiguity as to the meaning of "business necessity" was created
by Griggs, and had never before been clarified. The clarification pro-
vided by Wards Cove Packing certainly does not follow any diction-
ary definition of "necessity," and probably alters the conception of
"business necessity" held by most lower courts. Nonetheless, this re-
definition should not dramatically alter the obligation of employers to
present approximately the same level of evidence to show a manifest
relationship between an exclusionary device and business reasons for
its use.
Where Wards Cove Packing dramatically changed the law is after
such evidence has been presented by the defendant; it shifts to plain-
tiffs the ultimate burden of convincing the fact finder to reject defen-
dant's evidence in favor of plaintiff's evidence, by demonstrating the
lack of substantial business reasons. While this shift in the burden is
dramatic in appearance, only in cases where the defendant has suc-
ceeded in carrying the considerable burden of providing the level of
evidence necessary to satisfy the stringent production demands of
Griggs, Dothard, and Albemarle Paper will there be any difference in
result. Lower courts must not forget that Wards Cove Packing did not
reverse any of these leading cases. They still stand, but as reconstrued,
they stand for the proposition that in each case the defendants failed
because they did not present sufficient evidence to carry their burden.
This change in burdens of persuasion, while still retaining the holdings
of prior authority, should not dramatically alter the outcome of many
cases. Nonetheless, this modified burden of persuasion no doubt will
produce different results in close cases where defendants have suffi-
cient evidence of a substantial business purpose and plaintiff has evi-
dence challenging the viability of defendant's showing. Since plaintiffs
now carry the ultimate burden of persuasion, they may well lose con-
tested cases in which they would have prevailed prior to Wards Cove
Packing. Griggs is certainly not dead, only wounded.
Perhaps this is for the better. The Wards Cove Packing shift both
emphasized the wooden nature of a Griggs-inspired impact analysis
and dramatized the fluctuation of standards based solely on the
Court's current socio-economic predilections. Wards Cove Packing
suggested that Griggs is not sacrosanct; its premises are open to ques-
tion. Such a question might be whether to revisit the motive-driven
labor relations analysis in impact cases. Giving proper scope to Title
VII purposes of eliminating "unnecessary" barriers to employment
opportunity, while allowing employers appropriate discretion, the
Court should rethink its rejection of motive as a key element of Title
VII, and consider adopting the analysis given to motive in the labor
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relations statutes. Such an analysis would vary defendant's burden of
justification based on the degree of impact the challenged device im-
poses on a protected class. Slight impact of a device on minority em-
ployment opportunities would impose on employers only the Wards
Cove Packing burden of presenting evidence of a substantial business
reason for using the device. On the other hand, impact that is devas-
tating to employment opportunities of women and minorities would
have to be justified by the original Griggs standard of proving the
business necessity for the device. Such a flexible approach would facil-
itate a utilitarian balancing of Title VII goals of economic opportunity
and employment goals of economic efficiency.
HeinOnline  -- 17 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 47 1989-1990
HeinOnline  -- 17 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 48 1989-1990
